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FEDERAL REGULATION OF HOLDING COMPANIES: THE
PUBLIC UTILITY ACT OF 1935
WHILE the Public Utility Act of 19351 may be attributed in large measure to
the recent business depression, more deep-rooted social, economic, and legal
causes contributed to its enactment. The unprecedented growth in the electric
light and power industry has been one of the major factors contributing to the
the creation of the problem which the Act seeks to solve.2  In slightly more
1. P. L. No. 333, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). The Act is divided Into two titles of
which Ttitle I is addressed to holding companies and is separately known as the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. Except where otherwise indicated this Comment is
restricted to Title I. Title II is concerned with Amendments to the Federal Water Power
Act [41 STAr. 1063 (1920), 16 U. S. C. A. § 791 (1926)] and regulation of utility operat-
ing companies.
2. This is by no means the only factor, but it is by far the most dramatic. See In
general Ruggles, Regulation of Electric Light and Power Utilities, (1929 Supp.) 19 Am.
ECoN. REv. 179; Smith, Uncontrolled Expansion in the Light and Power Industry (1933)
42 YALE L. J. 1153; 5 ExcYC. Soc. Sc. 456. The most noticeable growth In the industry
has been since 1922.
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than half a century the industry has grown from an ex'perimental contrivance
to an enterprise involving billions of dollars in investment.3 A feature no less
important than the physical growth of the industry,4 especially from the stand-
point of federal regulation, has been the constant and still continuing transition
in the nature of the industry from a local one, with a limited distribution radius,
to one regional in scope, with an ever increasing volume of power transmitted
across state lines.5 The chief element in this trend is the technical advance
3. For an historical survey of the early growth of electric lighting see Jo:.s Am
BIGHAnS, PPanciPL.s oF PUBLic UTn'nms (1931) 29 et seq. The first central electric light
plant was installed in New York in 1882. NAsH, Ecoomncs or Pun=ac UT==IES (2d ed.
1931) 6. Now electricity has become so important to daily life that a connection has
been spelled out between it and health and also crime. See 2 Mm.no, MuznciPAL Gov-
mavaIT aNm AnDsr A2io. (1923) 362; Opinion of the Justices, 150 Mass. 592, 24
N. E. 1034 (1890).
4. The value of central electric light and power stations increased from $504,740,W52
in 1902 to $4,465,015,691 in 1922 with a still larger increase in the next five years so that
in 1927 the value was $9,297,458,356 and in 1932 it had reached a value of approximately
thirteen billion dollars. Generating capacity swelled from (1902) 1,2000CD0 kilowatts
to (1922) 14,300,000 kilowatts, and in 1932 reached a total of 33,592,500 kilowatts. The
annual output in kilowatt hours ranged from 2,500,000,000 in 1902 to 90,034,428,000 in
1929, although something of a loss was suffered thereafter, the amount being (in 1933)
79,017,666,000 kilowatt hours. The national importance of the industry becomes apparent
when it is known that 70% of the homes in the United States have electrical service and
that 68% of the population live in homes thus electrically equipped. These and other
statistics can be found in FEDEA.L TADE Coa ssio., Erxcmc Pown L:'Dousrny (1927)
69th Cong. 2d Sess., SE. r. Doc. No. 213, p. XVIII and pp. 27 et seq.; Mloo 's, Punuc
UTInIEs (1934); FEDERAL TADE Coam ssio REPORT, UT==s? Coro0ATion:s (1935),
70th Cong., Ist Sess., Sxn. Doc. No. 92, pt. 72A, pp. 23 et seq.; 105 Er.zcrA cAr Wo.as
(March 30, 1935-Recovery Number) 698.
5. Various statistical compilations of the amount of power moving across state lines have
been made. All of them reveal a steady increase both in total kilowatt hours and in the
percentage relation between that total and all the kilowatt hours available for ditribution.
However, the most recent figures, those gathered by the Edison Electric Institute, The
Electric Lighit and Power Industry in 1934, Statistical Bulletin No. 2, (April 1935) 9, show
a slight decrease in the total percentage of interstate power from 17.8% in 1933, to 17.5%
in 1934. The volume of such power showed an increase, nevertheless, from 14,146,000,00
kilowatt hours to 14,797,000,000 kilowatt hours. These figures apparently include all plants
whether publicly or privately owned. If local municipal plants were excluded, the percent-
age would be noticeably higher. Even including all plants these figures are somewhat
lower than those compiled by other agencies. For example the E. E. I. indicates that in
1929, of the total amount of power generated, 12.5% moved across state lines. The
FEDERAL TRADE CoannssiO= REPoRT supra note 4, pt. 72A, p. 42-43 gives the percentage
as being 13.4; and if only privately owned plants are considered, the figure becomes 14.75.
See also ErsaPx, LrRsTAz Tu-sanssioi or ELrcrric PowvR (1931) 57-64; FED -nA
TRADE ComnfssioN, Iz'zTERsTAT. Movmzcexr or ELEcEIc Em"m (1931) 71st Cong., 3d
Sess., Smz. Doc. No. 238. This latter survey of the Federal Trade Commicion reveals that
in four states in 1929 over 50%o of the power generated within the state was exported
(Vt., 76.26%; Md., 72.20%; Idaho, 58.48%; R. I., 54.89%); and in seven states over 50%
of all the power consumed within the state was imported (Mis., 107.49%; Ark., 103.70%;
Del., 79.1%; Nev., 64.81%; Utah, 64.16%; Mo., 58.28c; W. Va. 50.44%) (including the
power lost in transmission and that reshipped to other states). This same survey reveal
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which allows electricity to be distributed economically over wide areas.0
Concomitant with this development, further centralization of the industry seems
inevitable. The economies made possible by combination7 have been largely
instrumental in causing utility interests to vie with one another in the acquisi-
tion of properties which may subsequently be united into a centralized and more
efficient system. And of all the possible means of combination, that of stock
acquisition, or what has come to be known as the holding company device, of-
fers special advantages.8 Although it was not widely employed before 1889
because of the common law prohibition against a corporation's permanently
holding stock in another unless expressly authorized to do so, it was far from
unknown either to industry or the courts. And after New Jersey first let down
the legal bars, its use became general.10 But the device soon was divorced from
the extensive physical interconnection of distribution lines, forming a continuous web over
the nation (pp. 53, 54; and Map VII facing p. 120). For the most recent data on the
interstate character of transmission systems, see FEDERAL TRADE CoMImssI N REPORT (1935),
supra note 4, pt. 72A, pp. 39-42.
6. A radius of 250 miles is usually the present limit of economical service by one
generating plant. Greater distances can be achieved by tying in other plants, however.
The use of the thyraton radio tube presents the latest technical possibility of opening up
still wider fields of interstate transmission. See FEAGIm, FUNDAMENTALS or rsE ELrrnuc
LIGHT AN POWER BusINEss As AFFECTING PROBLEMS or REGULATIoN (1935) 16; NASu,
EcoNomcs or Punrac UTnxms (2d ed. 1931) 472 et seq.
7. In the electric industry the higher diversity of load factor is a major source of
economy to large plants. For an excellent discussion of the economies made possible by
combination, see JONES & BIGAm, op. cit. supra note 3, at 72 et seq.; also BuRTcIETT,
CORPORATION FiNANcE (1934) 621.
8. Other combination devices, as consolidation, merger, and purchase of assets, are
fraught with obstacles including the opposition of the corporate officers, the obstruction
of minority interests, the difficulties of negotiating comparative values and arranging the
business affairs of the uniting corporations. See BASSET, OPrEArINO AsrEzcrs or MEROERS
(1930) 139. As a trial device or provisional form of consolidation, stock ownership has a
real value. Field, Holding Corporation Control as a Provisional Form of Consolidation
(1932) 8 J. LAND & P. U. EcoN. 87.
9. For the position of the holding company in common law see 6 FLETCnzR, Cyc. Conr.
(1931) §§ 2825, 2826. For the extent of the use of the holding company device prior to
1889 see BoNBRiGHT & MEANs, THE HOLDING COMPANY (1932) 58 et seq.; BURmCnTlr, op.
cit. supra note 7, at 325, n. 3; FEDERAL TRADE CotMmIssIox REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 73A at
8, 9. Contrary to the implications of some authors, the holding company is not a typically
American device. The earliest European utility holding companies were formed at about
the same time as the first American ones; see FEAGiN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 89. On the
European holding company, in general, see LmFmANN, BFEILIOUNOS UND FIxANZIEt-
UNGsGEsELLscHAFrEN (1909); TcHERNor, ENTENTES EcoNomiQuES ET FixANCiERES (1933)
ch. 13.
10. Some looseness exists among writers as to the date on which New Jersey legislated
the common law prohibition against stock acquisition out of existence. In the Acts of 1888,
New Jersey sanctioned the purchase of stock by domestic corporations authorized to hold
the stock of foreign corporations and by specific corprations in concerns doing an ancillary
business: LAws or NEw JERsEY (1888) ch. 269, § 1; id. ch. 295, § 1. But it was not until
May of the following year that the power was given to domestic corporations in general
to hold stock in companies doing a related business and issue stock against those assets:
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its legitimate function of affording efficient management, becoming rather a
vehicle for the selfish manipulation of properties and for financial profiteering.
Pyramiding and combinations, frequently heedless of resulting economic waste
or precariousness of financial structure, have been so extensive that in 1929
sixteen holding company groups controlled 92% of the power produced by
private companies in the United States.n New York statistics show that, in
1928, 98.5% of the electricity sold within that state was sold by operating
companies belonging to a holding company system.12  And so national is the
character of this holding company dominance that, in 1930, the Electric Bond
and Share Company distributed electric energy in thirty-one states in such
widely separated localities as Oregon, Arizona, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Texas,
and Florida.' 3
For a time the holding company and the electric industry seemed mutually
to serve each other's interests and, in so doing, to serve the public interest. But
when the era of credit prosperity came to a close, the modern holding com-
pany's conflict with the real interests of the electric industry and therefore of
the public became apparent.' 4 The problem thus presented was to discover
how the public interest in cheap rates, good service, and sound investments
could be safeguarded, and the holding company device, as a result, utilized for
the public benefit. 5
LAws oF NEw JFaSEY (1889) ch. 265, § 4. Thereafter the race for incorporation fee waus
keen among the states. F.mD.AL TRADE Coazs siox REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 73A at 10;
SEAGER & GuxaCK, TRusr AND Coapo ATion PROBLEATS (1929) 55. The device of stock
acquisition is now authorized in one form or another in 39 states. For a compilation of
state statutes and decisions on stock acquisition, see FEDRAL TRMD Coara sio Rronr,
supra note 4, pt. 69A at 183 et seq. The holding company has become the predominant
form of corporate organization. BzaL AND MrArcs, Tm MonzDm CoRn0.oA'o0:x %:;D Pnwvxrx
PRoPERTY (1932) 205.
11. FEDERAL TRADE COm-rssiox REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 73A at 33. And three large
holding company groups control 407 of the industry. See REoPRT or TiEm Nxo- xL Powrn
Porcy Co mmaTEE, H. R. Doc. No. 137, p. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
12. 1 REPORT OF CommmIsSlox ox REvisiox or THE PunLic SERvIEn Co,mo. L,%w, (N.
Y. 1930) 141. In 1929, 82.3% of the kilowatt hours generated in the United States by
private companies was produced by holding company groups. In 1932 the percentage had
decreased to 78.8%. FED. TRADE Co=. REP., supra note 4, pt. 72A at 38.
13. FED. TADE Coarar REP., supra note 4, pt. 72A at 55, 56 (with excellent maps shov-
ing extraordinary advances made in recent years in the enlarging of the field of operation of
particular utility groups) and maps facing p. 88. Other holding company groups were not
far behind: Middle West Utilities Co. operated in 29 states, and Associated Gas & Electric
Co., in 23. It is this disorganized assimilation of properties, heedless of operating efficiency
which has been a particular target for utility critics. The utility interests in reply seek ju-stifica-
tion on the basis of the diversity of risk thereby achieved. BIAZER, Ecrnvn RErc..uno,.
or PuBaic Unizs (1925) 321-328; BOwmunr Ai.D BMIns, Tim HoLDn Conix.pAi
(1932) 154-159. See note 18, infra.
14. Dillavou, Desirable Legal Changes in Holding Conpany Legisalion (1934) 7 AZT.
L. ScH. REv. 857.
15. Considerable interest in the problem has stimulated such investigations as that of the
Federal Trade Commission, now in its eighth year, begun pursuant to the Walsh Reolution,




The holding company has a valid economic function in the public utility
field. It can accomplish the integration of the electric service of an entire
economic and geographical region; it can offer superior technical efficiency; and
it can obtain the benefits of centralized management and centralized finance.10
In such an integrated system, overhead costs may be distributed over a larger
volume of business, and expenses can be further rqduced by the standardization
of materials and supplies, by the interconnection of distribution lines, and by
the interchangeability of equipment. Likewise the holding company can afford
to buy better equipment and employ men better trained in the technique of the
industry than can local units. The greater costs of better equipment and better-
trained men can be distributed among the local utilities, none of which could
afford to pay the entire cost alone. In addition,, centralization promotes large-
scale, long-distance planning, and, accordingly, maximum utility of operating
facilities is gained and the wastes of reduplication avoided.
In the realm of financial service there are three major functions attributable
to the holding company. One of these is the furnishing of common stock funds
to operating companies. 1  While this contribution of common-stock capital
would normally seem to be the function of local capitalists, such capital is not
always locally available. The holding company is supposedly better able to
borrow and supply funds because of the strength of its market position and be-
cause of its diversified holdings.' 8 A second financial function of holding com-
Company Control of Licenses (1932), as well as studies made by the states; see Report of
the New York Commission, cited in note 12, supra, and also the REI'ORT Or TUa MASSA-
CEUSETTS SPECIAL Con1T'TEE ON CONTROL AND CONDUCT OP PUBLIC U=Tuzs (1930).
Illuminating also are the annual reports of the Committee on Intercorporate Relationg
published in the PRoCsDINs OF THE NAT'L Assoc. or RR. & P. U. Commnes. The legis-
lation which the states have enacted in recent years is summarized in Doying, The 1935
Utility Legislation Throughout the States (1935) 16 P. U. FoRT. 531; Marlett & Traylor,
Public Utility Legislation in the Depression (1935) 11 J. LAND AND P. U. ECON. 173.
16. Likewise it facilitates the evasion of state laws, achieves limited liability, and cir-
cumvents after-acquired clauses. A detailed consideration of the uses of the holding com-
pany device, or its public and private advantages, is not here pertinent. There has been
extensive comment on that topic elsewhere. See, e.g., Chamberlain, Regulation of Public
Utility Holding Companies (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 365; DawNo, CORPORATION FINANCn
(1931) ch. 21; Field, Some Uses of Holding Corporations (1932) 8 J. LAND AND P. U. ECON.
175; Gephart, Securities of Holding Companies and the Investor (Supp. 1927) 17 Am.
EcoN. R y. 31; Greenlaw, The Regulation of Holding Companies (1932) 14 ACAD. or POL.
SCL PROC. 108; Lilienthal, Holding Companies and the Public Interest (1932) 44 NAT'L
Assoc. RR. AND Urn.. CoR's PROc. 65; Morehouse, Some Problems of State Control of
Public Utility Holding Companies (1929) 5 J. LAND AND P. U. EcoN. 19; Pardee, The
Holding Company in Public Utilities (1926) 11 ACAD. OF PoL. Scr. PRoc. 699; Raushenbush,
The Concentration of Control in Power (1927) 129 ANNALS 118; Symposium (1932) 159
ANNALS 1 et seq.
17. This function really is not performed by the holding company when the value of
the operating company property is written up excessively and stock issued against It. In
such cases the holding company exercises control over the operating company with little
or no cost to itself, the burden of financing having been shifted to others.
18. The situation would probably be rare today in which a sound operating company
[Vol. 45
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panies is in temporarily meeting the current capital needs of subsidiaries, pend-
ing permanent financing.' 9 Finally, the holding company can be of service to
operating companies in temporary senior security financing, when market con-
ditions are unfavorable to the sale of such securities to the investing public.
Satisfactory performance of these functions is dependent, however, on the
existence of a sound financial structure in the holding company. Experience
has taught that such financial integrity is not common.
In the realm of management and servicing the functions of the holding com-
pany are theoretically many. The combined resources of the holding company
system should enable it to perform with economy and in a superior manner
such services as purchasing, appliance merchandising, accounting, advertising,
marketing of securities, construction, engineering, legal assistance, and even com-
plete operation of the utility property. Centralized management can give to
every task the specialized talent required, and, because it employs such talent to
capacity, it can obtain the superior service at lower cost per utility.
It is generally conceded, therefore, that an integrated holding company system
could furnish to the public better and cheaper service than small, independent
companies. The fact, however, is that holding companies have failed to perform
the functions which are properly theirs, and have neglected to employ their
advantages in the public interest. In those cases in which the holding company
has secured the possible economies of operation, it has usually diverted those
savings to itself.20 It is the inherent evil of the modem holding company that
it is not formed for the purpose of investing in or operating utility properties,
but rather it is created in order to control those properties in its own interest as
would be unable to obtain common stock funds. This suggests the question, then, of
whether companies unable to get such capital on their own, should have it supplied by
holding companies. Hearings Before C6mmittee on Interstate Commerce or. Sen. 1725,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 217. Furthermore, the holding company is incapable of per-
forming this function unless its credit structure is sound. Perhaps the more frequent itua-
tion is that in 1khich the holding company draws upon the operating company for funds.
Cf. FED. TRamu Co=&r- REP., supra note 4, pt. 72A, at 860.
While some place emphasis on the diversified holdings of utility properties in various
sections of the country as spreading business risk, it can be questioned whether diversity
represented only by a variety of utility properties is really diversity at all. And mere
territorial diversification without prudent selection in order to secure a sound investment, as
distinguished from the purpose, for example, of obtaining speculative turnover profits may
prove to be a serious element of weakness. See Splawn, Is the Power Holding Company
Necessary? (1935) 11 J. LAND AND P. U. EcoN. 226, 229.
19. This is usually done by paying supply bills for the subsidiaries and allowing the
funds representing earned surplus to remain in their treasuries for dividends on their
common stocks which are owned by the holding company. The temporary open-account
indebtedness of the subsidiary to the holding company is thus built up. See FEn. TnADz
Comr . REP., supra note 4, pt. 72A, at 120.
20. See Morehouse, supra note 16, at 23; FED. TRasn Cor.=. REP., supra note 4, pt.
72A at 835. A comparison between rates of independent and holding company distribu-
tion systems reveals that whatever economies have been made have not been passd on to
the consumer in rates. Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
on H. R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 2196, 2197, 2198 (tables).
1936]
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distinct from the interests of investors and consumers. 21 Advantages of man-
agement efficiency have been lost when pyramiding produced a structure so
complex that even those who had established it had difficulty in understanding
its ramifications. Nor are absentee ownership and interlocking directorates
conducive either to management in the interests of the operating utility or to
an appreciation of the problems involved.22 Further, putative advantages in
management, finance, and technical efficiency have been rendered nugatory by
questionable corporate practices. Likewise, the potential advantages of integra-
tion have not been realized. The control achieved through corporate manipula-
tion has greatly outrun any proper integration of the properties acquired,
holding companies having failed for the most part to unify their scattered hold-
ings for the sake of efficient power distribution."3
Not only have the definite advantages of the holding company device been
withheld from the public, but the holding company in its policy and its practices
has added positive abuses to this negative evil.23 The activities of the holding
company which are prejudicial to the interests of consumers and investors may
be divided into two broad classes: the milking of operating companies, and the
abuses incident to an unsound financial structure and reckless financial practice.
The milking devices are multitudinous. 24 One of the more frequently used is
that of "dividend bleeding."2 5  Excessive dividend payments, padded expense
accounts, and extra-large official salaries are common. But intercompany ser-
vice contracts are the most widespread and the most lucrative of all the milking
devices. 26 The fees charged for services rendered under these contracts have
21. BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, TnE HOLDINGI COMPANY (1932) Appendix A, p. 343 (article
by Mound, Suits Alleging Mismanagement of Subsidiaries by Holding Companies or Parent
Companies); RiPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927) 276-353; Robinson, The
Holding Corporation (1910) 18 YALE Rxv. 390, (1910) 19 YALE: Rsv. 13; Stone, The Public
Influence of the Bar (1934) 48 HARV. L. Rxv. 1, 8, 9.
22. For an example of the extent to which directorates interlock see Hearings, supra note
20, at 832, 833, 947-954. See also Re Louisville Hydro-Electric Co., 1 P. U. R. (N. S.
1934) 454, 460.
23. The Federal Trade Commission listed by way of summary 19 questionable prac-
tices of holding companies, REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 73A, at 62. These findings of the
Federal Trade Commission were made the basis for the Public Utility Act [Section 1 (b)].
It is unnecessary here to make any detailed analysis of the practices of the holding com-
pany; they have been adequately described elsewhere, particularly by the Federal Trade
Commission, where substantiation may be found for the conclusions here set forth.
24. BURTEcETT, CORPoRAnoN FiNANcE (1934); Field, Use of Subsidiary Corporations i
Segregating Risks (1933) 9 J. LAND AND P. U. EcoN. 150, 162 et seq.; FED. TRADE COMM.
REP., supra note 4, pt. 72A, at 842 et seq.; and cf. Douglas and Shanks, Insudation Frout
Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 193.
25. The welfare of the operating companies is subordinated to the needs of the parent
company. Illuminating are the increased dividend payments made by the Insull sub-
sidiaries as the system was approaching inevitable bankruptcy. Field, supra note 24, at
163. In recognition of the undue burden which had been placed upon the subsidiaries,
some of their bonds actually rallied in the market when the holding company went Into
receivership.
26. This device enables the inner circle of the holding company to carve out huge profits
as operating expenses before any dividend can be declared by the subsidiary. The legitimate
[Vol. 45
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been such as to yield large profits over and above the cost of rendering such
service.27  Intercompany sales have supplied another profitable way in which
the subsidiary company may be exploited.28  Properties may be bought by
one member of a holding company system and then sold to another member at
an excessive profit. Further, a prosperous company seeking to avoid a lowering
of its rates on the basis of its rich return may purchase electric energy from a
less prosperous company at a high price, or may sell power to such a company
at a low price. In either case the profits of both companies may be kept just
below the regulation point and rate reductions denied to consumers.p Another
form of exploitation practiced until recently was that of manipulation of in-
upward flow of operating company earnings, as interest and dividends, is thereby diverted.
As often used, this device is in fraud of the stockholders. See Splawn, Hearings, supra note
20, at 2194. Servicing profits as high as 100% to 200q are not unknown (Electric Bond
and Share Company) Hearings (Senate), supra note 18, at 83, 84, 282. The FED. TrLn
Comrm. R as., supra note 4, pt. 72A, pp. 599 to 66S makes a detailed survey of servicing
practices, and Appendix L. 5, p. 167, of pt. 73A of the same report discusses the legal statu3
of these practices under state law.
27. The profit-making management service contracts have professedly been abandoned
in recent years by some companies, notably Commonwealth & Southern, and, in their place,
service-at-cost contracts have been substituted. This is the so-called mutual service com-
pany principle. If the cost of such service is less than is estimated, the difference will be
distributed as dividends. The only quarrel with this device is that the excessive charge
remains as an operating expense and the basis for rate-making is thereby larger than
justifiable. BoxRIGHT~ AND M Aws, op. cit. supra note 13, at 186.
28. FED. TRADF Comr- RPRp., supra note 4, pt. 72A, at 851; Afosmm mwx CnAwrorD,
Pussac UTrr REGULATION (1932) 322 et seq. Commissions on the sale of securities have
also provided a material income for holding companies. Occasionally the normal flotation
of securities was increased in order that additional underwriting profits might be obtained.
The cycle is then completed by a recall of the issue and replacement by new obligations
from which new profits accrue to the issuer. Barnes, The Public Utility Holding Company,
Finance or Fraud?, an unpublished manuscript in the library of the Yale School of Law.
29. If the transaction is an interstate one, the state Commisons are powerless to con-
trol it. Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam and Electric
Company, 273 U. S. 83 (1927); cf. Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298 (1924). If
the sales, instead of being "wholesale" ones to distributors, are "retail" ones to consumers,
it would appear that the state commissions could regulate them in the absence of pertinent
Congressional legislation. Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 252 U. S.
23 (1920). While state commissions are powerless to prevent the payment of the inter-
state rate, they can inquire into its reasonableness when ascertaining operating expn is as
a basis for rates. Western Distributing Co. v. Public Service CommUion of Kansas, 285
U. S. 119 (1932). Yet even though the excessive price paid may have no immediate re-
flection in rates charged the consumer, its effect on the financial structure is such that
inevitably the consumer must pay. Inasmuch as all but I% of the interstate sales of power
are wholesale, it would appear that some such regulation as that imposed by Title II
of the Public Utility Act, is absolutely essential. Edison Electric Institute, Statistical
Bulletin No. 2, loc. cit. supra note 5. In general see: Ersman, I-E=STATE Tnaxss.su slo:
or ELECTI C Powan (1931); Scott, State and Federal Control of Power Trarsmission as Af-
fected by the Interstate Commerce Clause (1931) 14 AcaD. POL. Scr. Pn . 135; Wells,
Federal and State Relations in the Control of Power Detelopment and Distribution (1927)
129 AnxALS 126.
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come taxes.8 0 The holding company could collect the full amount of such a
tax from the operating company and then retain for itself the difference between
what was paid it by the subsidiary and what it had to pay in to the govern-
ment, by virtue of the reductions granted for consolidation. An abuse of hold-
ing companies which might be included either in the category of milking
devices or of unsound financial practices is the failure to make adequate pro-
vision for depreciation. Imprudent purchases of operating units at high prices
and write-ups of utility properties against which securities were subsequently
issued left the utility management with the serious problem of earning suf-
ficient net income to pay interest and dividends. Under the pressure to pay
these dividends and to preserve the credit standing necessary to float new
obligations, the temptation to show a fictitious net income has proved too great.
Depreciation-skimping practices are one way in which this has been accom-
plished.3 1 In all of these cases there have been taken from operating com-
panies funds which should have remained there. As a result operating costs
have been inflated or credit standing impaired. Both of these results are
adverse to the interests of the 6onsumer and the investor.
Reckless financial transactions are the other major threat to the welfare of the
investor and the consumer. The possibility of pyramiding corporations on top
of each other by means of stock ownership is the most serious defect of the
holding company system. It enables a relatively small actual investment in
common stock at the top to control underlying operating companies with assets
of millions of dollars. This thin equity at the top then becomes the recipient of
all residual earnings over and above the low fixed dividend and interest require-
ments of senior securities. A dangerous speculative interest in the common
stock of holding companies is thereby created. The yield of this stock may
sometimes be over 200% on the actual investment;8 2 and yet at other times
there will be no return at all, if the earnings of the operating company are not
enough to pay off the preferred security issues. Pyramiding also produces the
situation in which holding companies issue preferred stocks and bonds which
are not represented by physical assets, but are merely prior claims to earnings of
a common stock held by the holding company.33 By pyramiding, a concen-
30. The privilege of consolidated returns was abolished by the Revenue Act of 1934, 48
STAT. 720, 26 U. S. C. A. § 141 (d) (3) (1934) for all affiliated corporations except rail-
roads.
For tax avoidance made possible by the holding company set-up, see Breckenridge, Tax
Escape By Manipulations of the Holding Company (1931) 9 N. C. L. Rnv. 189.
31. Other consequences of imprudence are higher rates, lowered service, postponements
of extensions, the deferring of maintenance and renewal charges, and a diversion of surplus.
Cf. Re Lockport Gas & Electric Light Co. P. U. R. 1917F, 866, 871. The ultimate effect of
such a failure to include charges for renewals, extensions, etc. in the operating costs, Is to
make necessary the issuance of new securities to finance the continued operation of the
property.
32. This is known as "pyramiding of earnings" as distinguished from the "pyramiding
of control," by which one man or group of men with a small investment on their own part
can influence in their own interest millions of dollars of investment supplied by other people.
See MOSHER AN CRAwro a, PuBLIc UTn=m' REOULATIOm (1932), 241, 352.
33. See remarks of Representative Pettingill of Indiana and Robert Healy, Hearings,
supra note 20, at 212.
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tration of power which may have dangerous political as well as economic conse-
quences is placed in the hands of a small group. One or two individuals are
thereby enabled to control enormous amounts of capital supplied by many
other people.34 The practices conducted within this pyramid may be equally
objectionable. These include "upstream" loans,3 5 deceptive accounting210
issuance of no-par stock,37 security manipulation,38 interlocking directorates,
and capital inflation. 9 Particularly significant are the amounts by which the
fixed capital of operating companies has been written up, for there is a direct
relationship between the cost of a company's property and the rates which it
may be permitted to charge.40 Further, it is well understood now that not only
the capitalization, but the whole credit standing and financial structure of a
utility system are reflected in the rates charged to consumers, in the quality of
the service rendered, and in the number and nature of the extensions or replace-
ments made by the operating company.4 ' The investor also is subjected to
34. For an example see Hearings, supra note 20, at 2192, where a holding company
acquired properties for $5,800,000 and sold them subsequently to a subbolding company for
$9,500,000 of obligations, $5,000,000 worth of which was in voting stock. Keeping the
voting stock, the remaining securities were resold to the public for $5,000,000.
Ordinarily the justification of profit is the willingness to take the risk. Here the risk is
borne by the investors, and the real profits accrue to those who have maneuvered them-
selves out of the risk. See BRAa'nss, Ornz Pno0pi.s IOx= (1914).
35. Particularly when from sound subsidiaries to a parent in a precarious financial
position, or when the loan is beyond the capacity of the subsidiary to make or is on un-
favorable terms. "Downstream" loans may be similarly inequitable to the subsidiary if the
interest charges imposed are excessive.
36. Fin. T mE Commar. REP., supra note 4, pt. 72A, at S68 ff.; RwLaz, MtL; STR=
AND WALL STRxnr (1927) 309, 310 et seq. It is what Barnes, supra note 28, calls "accounting
legerdemain."
37. Bonbright, Dangers of Shares Without Par Value (1924) 24 COL. L. Ray. 449. Aho
the discussion with full citations by Austin, Stock Without Par Value, incorporated as Ap-
pendix L-2 of Fm. TRAD Comm. REP., supra note 4, pt. 73A at 83.
38. Field, The Substitution of Securities by Holding Companies (1930) 6 P. U. Fo-r.
222.
39. Write-ups of almost one billion and a half dollars were found by the Federal Trade
Commission. On figures claimed to be the most favorable to the utilities write-ups of
22% for operating companies, 16.57 for sub-holding companies, and 9.6%¢o for top holding
companies were revealed. Fed. Trade Comm. Release, Feb. 5, 1935; Gruening, Power as a
Campaign Issue (1932) 36 Cuax= HsrRY 46. Some write-ups are probably justifiable
as representing a real increase in value. MOsHR AND CRAwIORD, op. cit. supra note 32, at
345.
40. The reasonableness of rates is determined by the standard of a reasonable return
on the fair value of the property used. Smythe v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898); Mosmm
Aim CRAwroPD, op cit. supra note 32, at 180 et seq. Original cost is one of the decisive
factors in rate making; and there is always the danger that book values will be regarded
as actual values by the rate-making body. Indeed, usually there is no means of determin-
ing the actual value of utility property, so that biased appraisals or book values which
may include write-ups and improperly capitalized intangibles, are frequently accepted as
representing real value. While write-ups on the books of the holding company have no
such immediate effect on rates, they are nonetheless closely related; see note 41, infra.
41. The controversy over the influence of capitalization on rates is a plrsistent onz.
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danger when securities are issued against putative book values. Failure to earn
the interest or dividends on excessive security issues has been a major cause
of receiverships and other financial difficulties through which many utility
systems are now passing. Thus, it is generally recognized that, if consumers
are to be protected from unjust rates, investors from financial dissipation, the
nation at large from a power with dangerous political implications, and a vital
industry from control by powerful independent interests, some supervision must
be exercised over holding company policy.4
2
ALTERNATIVES or REGULATION
Local regulatory bodies, being more flexible and closer to the needs of their
own region, and having gathered invaluable knowledge and experience from
their many years of supervision in the utility field, may seem best fitted to
regulate the holding company. Nevertheless, state regulation in the past has
been inadequate; 43 this is indicated by the continued existence of holding com-
pany practices such as have been outlined above. Yet it is possible that strict
regulation, if reserved by the states over holding companies which they in-
corporate, would in large measure eliminate the evils now current. To be ef-
fective, however, such regulation postulates similar laws in every state of the
Legalistically, it may be said with some accuracy that capitalization and financial integrity
have nothing to do with the scale of rates inasmuch as the usual formula for fixing rates
makes no mention of capitalization or financial structure. Actually, however, if financial
structure is not sound, the rate structure cannot be sound. Whitney, Relation of the Bankers
to the Public Utilities (1929) 44 SroNE & WmsTm JOURNAL, 26, 30. The legalistic ap-
proach disregards the fact that Public Service Commissions rarely itemize how a rate is de-
termined; they merely reach a decision. It is naive to suppose that the tremendous pres-
sure brought upon them by utility groups whose corporate existence would be jeopardized
by lower rates is not of compelling importance in the ultimate determination. Failure of
the Commissions to yield to the needs of such utility systems may, indeed, even be in the
nature of a public disservice if the existence of the utility is dependent upon It. See
especially Electric Public Utility Co. v. Public Service Comm., P. U. R. 1928E, 854, 862.
The standard discussion is in BONBPIUOH, RALROAD CAPIT ATiON (1920) ch. 1. See
also Bonbright, Should the Utility Holding Company be Regulated? (1931) 7 P. U. FORT.
195, followed on p. 204 with a reply by M. J. Insull; DeLong, Holding Company Practices
(1932) 10 P. U. FORT. 733, 737; Kynaston, Four Favorite Fallacies as to Utility Regulation
(1935) 15 P. U. Four. 460, 467; Lilienthal, The Regulation of Public Utility Holding Con.
panies (1929) 29 CoL. L. Rxv. 404, 424 et seq.; and the Round Table discussions in 39
NAT'L Assoc. oF RR. & UTiL. COI'RS (1927) 123 et seq., and 14 ACAD. or PoL, Sci. Paoc,
(1931) 157 et seq.
42. Utility executives themselves admit the need for reforms and have suggested regula-
tion which in many instances closely resembles that enacted by Congress in the Public
Utility Act. See Hearings, supra note 18, and note 20, passim.
43. Thorough discussions of state regulation, but no longer up to date, are those of
Lilienthal, The Regulation of Public Utility Holding Companies (1929) 29 COL. L. Rav. 404,
and Recent Developments in the Law of Public Utility Holding Companies (1931) 31 COL.
L. REV. 189; see also Legis. (1932) 45 HAIy. L. Ray. 729; Legis. (1933) 46 HAv. L. Rat.
508; Comment (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 941; and particularly Marlett and Traylor, Public
Utility Legislation in the Depression (1935) 11 J. LAND AND P. U. Eco. 173.
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union. From past experience the possibility of such legislation seems remote.
The more states that pass such laws, the greater will be the temptation to the
remaining states not to enact comparable ones; and the failure of one state so to
act would be fatal to effective regulation. And even should such laws be ob-
tained, there would be an almost insuperable administrative difficulty in the
regulation of a corporation with subsidiaries in every corner of the continent.
States anxious to safeguard their citizens are compelled to find some method
of controlling the activities of those foreign holding companies whose subsidiaries
operate within the state. Among the attempts to solve the jurisdictional prob-
lem involved are the definition of a public utility in such broad language as
to include holding companies4 Courts, however, refuse to construe holding
company activities as "doing business" within the state such as to justify
regulation.40 Another possible means of state regulation is through a disregard
of the corporate entity.47 While much has been written about the corporate
fiction in parent-subsidiary relationships, the circumstances under which the
courts will look behind the "corporate veil" are too rare and unpredictable to
make feasible this method of regulation.4" Direct control of holding companies
has also been sought by requiring commission consent and approval to the
acquisition of utility stock by a corporation.40 But the most frequent method
by which states have gained control over holding companies is that of indirec-
tion through control of the operating company. In this way control may be
had over the service contracts with affiliates, over loans, dividend payments,
and accounting. It is perplexing to estimate how effective a thoroughgoing
regulation along these lines would be, inasmuch as past experience has been so
limited.50 Yet it is obvious that state regulation presents the fundamental
44. Analogous difficulties were experienced by the states in their efforts to enact effective
anti-trust legislation. The trust problem was likewise a national one and the attempts of
the states to meet it single-handed resulted only in injury to themselves, by alienating
fruitful sources of revenue, without real benefit to the country. See SEru A, GuucE,
TUST AM CoRPoRATNx PROBLEMS (1929) 339-367.
45. See Lilienthal, Regulation of Public Utility Holding Companies (1929) 29 CoL. L.
REv. 404, 408; cf. Isaacs, Analysis of Doing Business (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 1018.
46. Public Utility Comm. v. Romberg, 275 Ill. 432, 114 N. E. 191 (1916); cf. Re
Bangor Railway & Electric Co., P. U. R. 1925E, 705, 712. Ownership of stock in a corpora-
tion does not constitute an entry into the business of that corporation. New Hamp-hire
Gas & Electric Co. v. Morse, 42 F. (2d) 490 (D. N. H. 1930).
47. Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations (1925) 14 CA='.
L. REv. 12; Greenlaw, Regulation of Holding Companies (1931) 14 AQD. OF POL. Sca.
Paoo. 108, 115; Welch, Lifting of the Corporate Veil of Public CompanieS (1930) 19
Gao. L. J. 280; WoRisER, Dismm.uRD or THE CoRPORTE Fxcynoi; (1927).
48. Comment (1931) 30 Mlica. L. Rzv. 1315, 1318; Comment (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 941,
946.
49. FEAGnr, FU-DAimiTALS or THE ELECtrC Licar aD PowR Busixass As Arracri:x
= PROBLE= OF R.Gur.AnsoN (1935) 124 et seq. where the pertinent statutes are cited
and discussed.
50. Only Wisconsin has an effectively worded statute giving to the state commission con-
trol over contracts within the utility system. See FrAn, op. cit. supra note 49, p. 110 (ser-
vice contracts), p. 119 (banking transactions), p. 122 (dividend payments); and also the
statutes and decisions compiled in Fa. TRADE Commsa. REP., supra note 4, pt. 69A, 183 et ceq.
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anomaly of dealing with a national problem by means of local machinery.
Regulation, to be effective, must be coterminous with the thing regulated.
More comprehensive legislation seems to be the only solution. It is doubtful
whether a scheme sufficiently comprehensive for adequate indirect state regula-
tion of holding company activities would survive jurisdictional and other con-
stitutional obstacles. If indirect control of the holding company is to be suf-
ficient for the protection of the consumer and the investor, there will be re-
quired such a full measure of control over the operating company as virtually to
constitute the regulating authority the operator, if not the owner, of the utility
property. It will be necessary to scrutinize minutely every phase of manage-
ment and policy, if the holding company is not to nullify the safeguards estab-
lished by the commission. While such detailed control may be necessary in the
public interest, anyway, nevertheless it is an unwieldy method of reaching that
which is more readily controllable by other agencies.' 1 Even assuming the
absence of jurisdictional and other constitutional barriers, indirect state regula-
tion of the holding company would present the incongruous picture of some
forty-nine jurisdictions endeavoring to control the same thing. The wasted
effort, reduplication, and the inevitable conflicts would be stupendous. And it
is highly improbable, not only that the regulatory laws of the various jurisdic-
tions would ever be sufficiently uniform or adequately co-ordinated to insure
competent control, but also that the individual regulatory commissions limited
in time, money, and personnel as they are, would be able effectively to enforce
the laws.
In the face of these limitations on and objections to state regulation of hold-
ing companies, other alternatives have been proposed.5 2 Of these the use of
the interstate compact has been most frequently suggested, particularly as a
solution to the problem of interstate power transmission 8 Inasmuch as a
holding company can domicile itself in a state not a party to a compact, it is
readily perceived that, regardless of the efficacy of the interstate compact under
other circumstances,5 4 it can contribute little to the effective control of hold-
ing companies. Unless every state participates in such agreements, the dlf-
51. It is very likely that even such control will fall short of its objective without control
over the accounts of the holding company. If accounts are unreliable or unintelligible,
regulation based on them cannot hope to be enlightened. Cf. Comment (1930) 40 YAxv.
L. J. 809.
52. The suggestion has been made that the compulsions of the Securities Act [48 STAT.
74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. c. 2A (Supp. 1934)] are sufficient. While, however, that Act
provides for a registration and publicity machine, plus an improved remedy to injured
investors, it does not prevent abuses, except as an indirect result. And the Securities
Exchange Act [48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. c. 2B (Supp. 1934)] is limited to certain
evil practices in the trading of securities.
53. See, for example, Bigham, Regulation of the Interstate Transmission of Electric
Power (1929) 5 J. LAD AND P. U. Ecox. 385; Gray, Dilemma of Giant Power Regulation
(1927) 129 ANNALS 110, 114, 115; Scott, Federal Control of Power Transmission (1930)
14 AcAD. POL. SC. PROC. 135.
54. The utility of interstate compacts has been well discussed by Frankfurter and Landis,
The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustment (1924) 34
Y.E L. .. 685, 703, 708-730; Comment (1935) 45 YA.n L. J. 324.
[Vol. 45
COMMENTS
ficulty of indirect control discussed in conjunction with state regulation, would
thwart the contracting sovereigns.t, Federal regulation appears to be the only
alternative.56 The holding company is no stranger to federal regulation; various
federal attempts to curb some of its manifestations have been made since the
Sherman Anti-Trust Law of 1890.57  In recent years further drastic legislation
has been directed specifically at it. s There are objections to federal control;r 9
and yet in view of the previous ineptitude of the states to protect the public
interest, such federal control seems necessary. The nationwide importance of
electric power, the nationwide control and infiltration by holding company
groups have made this a national problem. Federal regulation is but the dis-
charge by the federal government of a burden which the inevitable flow of
events has thrust upon it.60
55. Even where the jurisdictional obstacle of a holding company situated without the
state, and not "doing business" in the states in which its subsidiaries operate, is not
present, there are a number of seemingly valid objections to the use of compacts. They are
rigid and cumbersome devices which cannot well be used in a dynamic industry. A
multiplicity of such agreements would be necessary for effective solution of a national
problem, and the difficulty of reconciling the adverse interests of the various states may
prove insurmountable. Comment (1935) 45 YALE L. 3. 324.
56. This is a conclusion which has been widely reached: Bonbright, Recent Develop-
ments in the Law of Public Utility Holding Companies-A Comnment (1931) 31 CoL. L.
REv. 208, 211; Bigham, Regulation of Interstate Transnission of Mectric Power (1929) 5
3. LAND & P. U. Ecozz. 385, 396, 397; Crawford, Control of Interstate Transmsion of
Electricity (1929) 5 J. LAND & P. U. EcoN. 229; FEERAL POWER CoiCX[So.':, Howrs
ComiPANY CoNRoL or LicEsEmS (1932) VII. But cf. Goldberg, The Massachuselts Pro-
posals for Public Control (1930) 14 AcAD. PoL ScL Pnoc. 101, 107.
57. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1926) and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 38
STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 18 (1926), later emasculated by the courts. See Handler,
Industrial Mergers and the Anti-trust Laws (1932) 32 Cor. L. REv. 179, 260 et seq.
58. Emergency Transportation Act of 1933 (railroad holding companies) 48 STAT. 217
(1933), 49 U. S. C. A. § 5 (5, 6) (1934); Banking Act of 1933 (bank holding companies)
48 STAr. 186 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. § 61 (1934); 48 STAT. 166 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. §
331 (1934).
59. The usual arguments of bureaucracy, confusion, "red tape," and delay are made.
It is pointed out that a federal commission would be cumbersome and out of touch
with the full nature of the local problem. Even conceding the validity of these objec-
tions, it seems but a small sacrifice for the benefits which seemingly can be obtained.
Cf. REPORT or SprLaiA Co2m ssiov oN CO.NvoL Amm Coroucr or PuDnic Unuxrs
(MWssAcnusaris, 1930) 221.
60. The Federal Trade Commission suggested to Congress e ntially three methods
by which the necessary federal control might be secured. In the order in which they
commended themselves to the Commission, they were: (1) taxation, which was thought
most feasible because the limitations of the commerce power were not involved and
because it is definite and more easily administered; (2) direct statutory inhibitions de-
signed for the protection of both the rate-paying public and investors-in outline essn-
tially the measures adopted in the Public Utility Act; (3) a federal licensing act perhaps
supplemented by federal incorporation for all utilities doing an interstate business. Federal
incorporation statutes have repeatedly been suggested. See Hmusaxa, FizDEAL L'xcoroma-
T:EoN (1913); and also the extensive compilation of proposals and views for and againt
federal incorporation made in FED. TaAan Coam. REP., supra note 4, pt. 69A, pp. 3
_rough 143 with a bibliography at p. 137.
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THE PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935
It was to meet this situation that Congress enacted the Public Utility Act of
1935.61 After a preliminary declaration of policy and a definition of the major
terms as used in the context of the Act, 2 Title One provides for the exemption
of those holding companies which, because of the nature of their organization
or operation, cannot be of great importance to interstate commerce or the na-
tional public interest.03 The next section, Section 4 of Title One, is by far
the most important single provision of the Act. It makes various interstate
activities unlawful for all holding companies unless registered in accordance
with Section 5.64 And it is this registration which brings holding companies
61. As already indicated, supra note 1, the Act is divided into two titles, each of
which is concerned with a different aspect of the same problem. Title II, the essential
purpose of which is similar to that of the Couzens Bill (SEN. BILL 3869) 71st Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1930), discussed by its author in (1930) 6 P. U. FORT. 131, seeks to regulate
those ever-increasing interstate shipments of power which are subject to no effective state
control. In order to avoid jurisdictional conflict with state commissions, the Title extends
"only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the states." Section 201 (a).
The authority to administer the Title is conferred upon the Federal Power Commission,
rather than the Securities and Exchange Commission, which administers Title I (The
Holding Company Act).
Unless this Comment indicates to the contrary, any reference to the Commission means
the Securities and Exchange Commission.
62. Under § 2 (a) (7) the term "holding company" includes any company holding
or controlling 10% or more of the outstanding voting stock or any person who exercises
"such a controlling influence over the management or policies of any public utility or
holding company as to make it necessary or appropriate . . ." that such person be sub-
jected to the provisions of the Act. Exceptions were then made for those companies
which (1) do not "control" another company, (2) are not intermediaries through which
such control is exercised; (3) do not in any way exercise such a controlling influence
over management or policies as to make it "necessary or appropriate" that they be In-
cluded. The problem of definition so as to exclude investment trusts and insurance com-
panies, and yet to forestall evasive legal devices is not easy. See, for example, the
difficulty experienced by the New York Commission, MOSHR AND CRAWFORD, PUBJLIo
UTLIY REouLATioN (1933) 124, 125. Problems of definition are discussed in Hearings,
supra note 20, pp. 76, 77; see also Comment (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 941, 945. The
emphasis has here been placed upon "control" which, while perhaps legally hard to define,
is, as a practical matter, readily ascertainable. For a discussion of this and other pro-
visions of the Act, see Comment (1935) 30 ILL. L. R.v. 509.
63. The exemptions are found in § 3 and include (1) holding company systems pre-
dominantly intrastate in character, (2) holding companies which are predominantly local
operating companies, (3) companies which are only incidentally holding companies, being
primarily engaged in other business enterprises, (4) those companies which are only
temporarily holding companies, and (5) companies which derive no material part of their
income from public utility companies within the United States. In short, those companies
are exempted whose primary business is not that of a public utility holding company
of a distinct interstate character. Where "necessary and appropriate in the public in.
terest . . ." the Commission may exempt certain classes of persons from the obligations
of the Act. For rules already promulgated under this power to make exemptions see
New York Times, Nov. 9, 1935, at 21, col. 6; id., Nov. 25, 1935, at 29, col. 1.
64. For a discussion of the provisions of § 4, see infra. Section 5 specifies the items
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within the scope of the remainder of the Act. Sections 6 and 7 impose condi-
tions on the security practices of registered holding companies. 0 It is made
unlawful for a registered holding company or its subsidiary to issue, sell, or alter
securities unless a declaration has been filed with the Commission. Before such
a declaration can become effective, a reasonable time must elapse, during which
the Commission may issue an order to show cause why the proposed security
action should be taken. After a hearing it may forbid or permit the declaration
to become effective; but at no time is commission approval to be given unless
detailed requirements prescribed by Congress are complied with.C" A second
set of obligations is directed at the acquisition of any interest in any business
by registered holding companies or their subsidiaries. 7 With certain exceptions
the approval of the Commission must be obtained before such acquisitions can
be lawful. And here again Congress names the terms on which such approval
shall be given and outlines the information which must be provided in the
applications of those companies desiring new properties. The third set of
obligations which Congress has decreed shall bind registered holding companies
and their subsidiaries is contained in Section 11, which provides, in subsection
(a), that the Commission shall examine and determine to what extent (1) hold-
ing company systems may be simplified, (2) voting power equitably dis-
tributed among security holders, and (3) the properties and business of the
system confined to those necessary or appropriate to the operations of an
integrated public utility system. Paragraph (1) of subsection (b) makes it the
duty of the Commission to require by order, after January 1, 1938, the limita-
tion of holding companies to single integrated systems unless (A) such integrated
systems are less economical than diversified ownership, (B) additional systems
are regionalized within one power shed, and (C) the combined systems are not
so large as to impair the advantages of "localized management, efficient opera-
tion, or the effectiveness of regulation."0 8  Paragraph (2) of subsection (b)
which shall be included in the registration statements, such as: copies of charters, part-
nership agreements, and indentures of trust, and documents concerning organization,
financial structure, directors and officers, security structure, balance sheets, and similar
information.
65. Exemptions are made for (1) a limited amount of short term private debts,
(2) (discretionary) securities of subsidiaries which have been authorized by state com-
missions and are solely for the purpose of financing the subsidiary itself, and (3) securities
issued pursuant to the terms of any security outstanding on January 1, 1935, giving the
holder an option to convert.
66. Included among the requirements are: stock with par value, bonds well secured
by physical assets, reasonable adaptation of the new issue to the security structure and
earning power of the declarant, compliance with state laws, and reasonable fees in con-
nection with the issuance and sale.
67. Sections 8, 9, and 10.
68. Integration has been one of the motivating purposes of this legislation, and it is
this section which seeks to secure it. The advantages of integration have been indicated
supra; yet it has been objected to on the grounds that it destroys a valuable diversi-
fication of risk. Hearings, supra note 20, at 860; see also note 18. The light and power
industry is a relatively stable one and it is therefore questionable whether it requires
the geographical diversity which is now so common.
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empowers the Commission to require by order, likewise after January 1, 1938,
that registered holding companies and their subsidiaries take steps to "ensure
that the corporate structure or continued existence of any company in the
holding company system does not unduly or unnecessarily complicate the struc-
ture, or unfairly or inequitably distribute voting power among security holders
of such holding company system." This paragraph, then, seeks to eliminate
the intermediate holding company; but even more specifically this paragraph is
directed, in express words, at the elimination of the top or "super" holding
companies.69 The objective of Section 11, the remainder of which is devoted
largely to the procedural aspects of the inevitable reorganization in the struc-
ture that must accompany compliance with the Act, is removal from corporate
structures of those units which serve no desirable social or economic function.
Having thus made provision for a simpler and more integrated system, Congress
in the next section of the Act makes some stipulations as to future fiscal policy.
"Upstream loans" to registered holding companies are henceforth absolutely
banned and all loans and credit extensions made by registered holding com-
panies to the members of their systems are subjected to Commission rules.70
Excessive dividend payments and other objectionable fiscal practices are like-
wise prohibited. Also of interest are the clauses forbidding political contribu-
tions by members of a registered holding company system, and the declaration
making it unlawful to lobby before certain government bodies unless registra-
tion and information statements are recorded with the Commission by such
lobbyists. A fifth group of provisions centers about service, sales and con-
struction contracts, the power to participate in which is denied by Section 13 to
registered holding companies. Such contracts are restricted to mutual service
companies or subsidiaries of registered holding companies, or affiliates, or other
persons who operate in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the
Commission. Exceptional circumstances however will, as usual, justify exemp-
tions. The final set of obligations imposed on registered holding companies
provides for the submission of accounts, reports, and general information on
holding company affairs.71  The bulk of the remaining sections merely specify
the procedure to be followed by the Commission and the courts in the enforce-
ment of the Act, and set forth both the civil and criminal liabilities incurred by
any infraction of its terms.72
69. Section 11 (b) (2): "In carrying out the provisions of this paragraph the Com-
mission shall require each registered holding company . . . to take such action as the
Commission shall find necessary in order that such holding company shall cease to be
a holding company with respect to each of its subsidiary companies which itself has a
subsidiary company which is a holding company."
70. Sections 12 (a) and 12 (b).
71. Section 15.
72. By § 16 any person who makes misleading statements in any document or report
filed pursuant to the Act is subject to the same penalties as are provided in the Securltle
Exchange Act of 1934. Further penalties of fine and imprisonment for violations of the
Act are imposed by § 29.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE AcT
Any consideration of the constitutionality of the Act must center, in the first
instance, about Section 4. 3 It is this section which furnishes to holding com-
panies the first point of contact with the Act, and if this section is held in-
operative, the remainder of the Act becomes largely valueless.7 4 It supplies
the mechanism of federal control by prohibiting to unregistered holding com-
panies certain activities in interstate commerce and by dosing the channels of
commerce and the mails to designated uses by such companiess
The first of the prohibitions enumerated for unregistered holding companies
is that against the sale, transportation or distribution of electric energy across
state lines. This activity is dearly one which falls within the sphere of federal
power.76 The means here chosen for the exercise of the power, namely, pro-
hibition of interstate transmission unless certain conditions of regulation re-
quired by the public interest are complied with, seems unobjectionable. 77 The
further provision making it unlawful for any unregistered holding company to
control a subsidiary which transmits electric power in interstate commerce
appears to be justifiable on either of two grounds. It may be viewed as an es-
sential means of effectuating the detailed regulation of interstate transmission
provided for in Title Two, inasmuch as this latter regulation cannot be effective
unless the holding company activities which determine operating costs and the
stability of financial structure are subjected to supervision.7 s Or the provision
may be viewed as a regulation of activities which so directly affect or burden
73. There are two primary sources of power for this Act. One is the power to
establish post offices and post roads (U. S. Coxsr., Art. I, § 8, cl. 7); the other, the
power to regulate commerce (U. S. CoNsT., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3). It is interesting to note
that in The Matter of American States Public Service Company, decided on November
7, 1935 by Judge Coleman sitting in the Federal District Court for Maryland (opinion
printed in the Baltimore Daily Record, Nov. 9, 1935, at 3, col. 1) it was possible to
sustain the Act, as applied in that case, under a third power, that conferred on Congress
over "the subject of bankruptcies" (U. S. CoNsr., Art. I, § 8, cl. 4). Section 2 (a) (2)
expressly makes the terms of the Act applicable to "any receiver, trustee, or other liqui-
dating agent." Despite the existence of these three powers, Judge Coleman held the
Act invalid "in entirety."
74. The converse proposition, however, is not true. The remainder of the Act both
by intent (§ 32) and content is dearly severable. Yet cf. Matter of American States
Public Service Company, supra note 73.
75. Section 4 (b) operates on somewhat different lines, compelling holding companies
to register if they have outstanding any security which has been distributed by the use
of the mails or commerce, or offered for sale by like means subsequent to January 1, 1925
and if that security is held on October 1, 1935 by any person not a resident of the state
in which the holding company is organized. It seems impossible to reconcile such a
provision with the traditional theories of congressional power.
76. Public Utilities Comm. v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U. S. 83 (1927).
77. Especially since the objects of regulation have so demonstrable a connection v'ith
rates and service. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (U. S. 1819).
78. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (U. S. 1819); Shreveport Case,
234 U. S. 342, 351 (1914); Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153 (1926); Tranzit
Commission v. United States, 284 U. S. 360 (1932).
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the interstate commerce in electric energy that they fall within the commerce
power. 79
But in view of the fact that so many holding companies and their subsidiaries
are not engaged in the interstate transmission of electric power, and that such
transmission may easily be reduced to a minimum, no effective solution of the
holding company problem can result from regulation which depends for its
validity upon actual interstate transmission. To avoid such a limited applica-
tion of the Act, unregistered holding companies are further forbidden to employ
the mails or the instrumentalities of commerce in the distribution or public
offering, for sale or exchange, of any security of several enumerated types of
companies.80 Restrictions on the use of the channels of commerce, in an
effort to prevent them from being used for socially undesirable purposes, have
frequently been employed by Congress and sustained by the courts.81 This
exercise of the commerce power has often been referred to as if it were in
effect a national police power.82 Inasmuch as unsound securities are manifestly
harmful to their purchasers, and the harm they effect is not confined to local
areas, and the use of the channels of commerce and the mails is essential to the
production of injury, it may be argued that the prohibition of the distribution of
such securities is within the Lottery Case. The fact that the restriction on the
distribution of securities is conditional upon registration should not militate
against the validity of the prohibition if the registration provisions can be re-
garded as establishing a proper administrative scheme for determining what
securities are unsound and therefore to be denied the use of the channels of
interstate commerce. But registration is more than a revelation of business
matters which when published would enable the investor to protect himself, more
even than a method of determining the soundness or unsoundness of a given
security.s3 It requires the subjection of the registrant to the active and positive
79. Cf. Northern Securities Company v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904); see
United States v. Ferger, 250 U. S. 199, 203 (1919); Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen,
262 U. S. 1, 37 (1922); Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U. S. 495,
544 (1935).
80. Section 4 (a) (3).
81. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137 (1902) (diseased cattle); Lottery Case, 188 U. S.
321 (1903) (lottery tickets); Hippolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 45 (1911)
(adulterated food & drugs); Hoke and Economides v. United States, 227 U. S. 308
(1913) (white slaves); Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 325 (1915) (prize-fight films); Clark
Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Rr. Co., 242 U. S. 311 (1917) (liquors); Brooks v.
United States, 267 U. S. 432 (1925) (stolen automobiles).
82. See Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 516 (1922); Chicago Board of Trade v.
Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 41 (1922); Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432, 436 (1925).
83. Compare with the Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A.
c. 2A (Supp. 1934). This Act has been sustained in several lower court decisions:
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Wickham, decided Sept. 17, 1935 (D. Minn.);
Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1935, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 14, 1935, at 2415,
col. 2 (C. C. A. 2d). See also a symposium on the Securities Act in 43 YAmr L. J. 171
et seq. (1933); Martin, Constitutionality of the Securities and JEchange Act of 1934
(1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 811; Comment (1933) 31 MIcH. L. Rav. 1117; Comment (1933)
19 ST. Louis L. Rv. 69. The only limitation that has been made on the extent of the
power is that it cannot be used to regulate purely local matter, where the evil Is ac-
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control of the Securities and Exchange Commission. It appears that this law,
then, was intended not solely to exclude an article inimical to the public, but
also to end the corporate practices which made that article an instrument of
harm. If Congress had confined the Act to an exclusion of securities deemed
to be harmful, and named the circumstances under which they became evil,
the Lottery Case would seem dearly to apply; but when the exclusion is a device
to impose a scheme of affirmative regulation, 4 a different situation is presented.
No case as yet has decided whether, under the power to exclude, Congress may
take steps to prevent the production of the harmful articlePsa
The burden, then, of making this Act legally and practically effective may
shift to the remaining provisions of Section 4. These close the channels of
commerce, unless the holding companies are registered, to that cluster of activi-
ties surrounding intercompany contracts and the acquisition of any interest in,
or the assets of other utility or business enterprises."0 The prohibition of
these uses of the instrumentalities of commerce is the same in principle as that
discussed with reference to security issues, lottery tickets, or prize-fight films;
yet it is distinguishable on its facts. It varies from the situations previously
considered in the fact that injury is not effected by such intercompany con-
tracts until the public buys securities made infirm thereby, or purchases elec-
tricity, the rates and service of which reflect the intercorporate practices. Thus
the injury is further removed from the prohibited interstate shipment than
has been the case in any prohibition which has heretofore received judicial
approval. If, however, the line of cases allowing exclusion is not to be extended
to cover this added situation, the prohibition and the subsequent regulatory pro-
visions may nevertheless be sustained as a direct regulation of interstate com-
merce by recognizing'the commercial intercourse, implicit in the holding com-
complished before the interstate shipment is made. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S.
251 (1917).
84. Such as the subsequent provisions abolishing upstream loans, simplifying corporate
structure, prohibiting the participation in intercompany contracts by a registered holding
company, ending the house-to-house canvass, controlling acquisitions, and imposing a
great number of other positive regulations. While it has been -ettled that Congrezs can
prohibit the interstate distribution of lottery tickets, it is not so clear that Congres
could use that prohibition as a means of gaining control over the busines of issuing
lottery tickets. Yet it cannot be denied that the more effective way to eradicate an evil
is to control its source, rather than to prohibit certain of its manifestations.
85. The provisions of Sections 4 (a) (3) and 4 (a) (6), denying to unregistered
holding companies the right to sell securities-even intrastate--if there is reason to
believe that these securities will subsequently be offered or sold in interstate commerce,
and making it unlawful for an unregistered holding company to control a subsidiary
which engages in interstate distribution of securities, seem difficult to sustain. Since the
interstate distribution-the only matter to which Congress' power extends directly-could
probably be prevented as effectively by absolute prohibition, these provisions may be con-
sidered to usurp unnecessary control over local matters. Yet it is possible that if the
Court approves the other provisions, it may sustain these also, on the ground that they
are reasonably adapted to making the others effective.
86. Sections 4 (a) (2) and 4 (a) (4). Also the residual clause § 4 (a) (5) making
it unlawful for an unregistered holding company "to engage in any business in inter-
state commerce."
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pany control of subsidiaries in varous states, as being interstate commerce.
It is difficult to perceive any reason why this intercourse is not commerce in the
legal sense, for there is a constant stream of interstate activity between mem-
bers of a multi-state holding company system. It is primarily this stream of
interstate activity which Congress has sought to regulate, the great bulk of the
provisions of the Act being closely identified with some transaction in or phase
of this holding company-subsidiary commerce. The definition of interstate
commerce in the Act similarly is based on the proposition that the interstate
holding company functions are commerce within the sphere of federal control,8 7
and since commerce is intercourse, and not confined to the interchange of
tangible things,88 nor limited to the relationships known to the framers of the
Constitution, 9 it seems broad enough to include the unique modern phenomenon
of the complex business relationship between holding companies and their sub-
sidiaries in other states. No definition of commerce heretofore propounded by
the courts is so worded as to exclude the constant intercourse which charac-
terizes this holding company relationship with its subsidiaries. The probable
reason why such intra-system relationships have not been declared in the past
to be interstate commerce is that the issue has never been before the Court.
That this legal recognition may be forthcoming, however, is indicated by the
recent decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Smith. 0 In that case the
court emphasized the commerce in tangibles to which the intercompany contracts
gave rise. But whether or not insistence on tangible interchange is made by
the courts, the business of directing subsidiaries appears to qualify as interstate
commerce. If the contracts, policy direction, and instructions exchanged are
not enough to make this relationship commerce, then the money, appliances,
reports, merchandise, letters, securities, and accounts which are in constant
circulation among the units of the holding company system should be sufficient.
The business of the holding company is indistinguishable from that constant
traffic in intelligence, instruction, and reports which was held in International
Textbook Co. v. Pigg9 ' to be interstate commerce. Furthermore, the intercourse
between the units of a holding company system results in far more interstate
movement of tangibles than does the business of a correspondence school. And
it is of cardinal importance that the holding companies brought within the
compass of the Public Utility Act are not those whose business is stock owner-
ship and the exercise of the mere voting control resulting therefrom. The Act,
on the contrary, embraces only those companies whose primary business is the
policy direction and the control of the management of subsidiaries. The inter-
87. Section 2 (a) (28).
88. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. S. 347, 356 (1887); Federal
Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers, 289 U. S. 266, 279 (1932).
89. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1, 9 (1877).
90. 1 F. Supp. 247 (S. D. N. Y. 1932) (holding that the making of purchasing
contracts involving the shipment of merchandise interstate, constituted interstate com-
merce; and saying, obiter, that the legal, fiscal, investigatory, secretarial, advisory, and
engineering functions were not, under the facts presented, interstate commerce),
91. 217 U. S. 91 (1910). International Textbook Co. v. Lynch, 218 U. S. 664 (1910)
was decided on the authority of the Pigg case.
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state transactions here involved are therefore not casual or incidental 2
If the thesis that this business of the holding company is interstate com-
merce is accepted, then the transactions involved in that commerce are validly
subjected to Congressional control. And so, likewise, those engaging in such
commerce are proper subjects of federal supervision. Furthermore, the regula-
tion here imposed on registered holding companies seems reasonably connected
with the interstate activities of such companies, since the major business trans-
actions accorded specific attention by the Act-such as security issues, acquisi-
tions, intercompany contracts, loans, dividends, and accounts--are integral parts
of the stream of holding company commerce. To sustain Section 4, so far as
the commerce clause is concerned, it seems necessary only to establish that
the tangible business exchanges across state lines there prohibited are interstate
commerce. The remaining sections may be justified in the main as regulations
of other aspects and types of holding company commerce with members of the
individual holding company's system. Where the regulation is admittedly one
of intrastate activities, its justification can come only from the fact that those
activities cannot be dissociated from the interstate ones, and that effective
regulation postulates control over both. It is arguable, then, that the commerce
clause provides constitutional foundation for federal holding company regula-
tion. Specific cases, however, will present perplexing problems of just when
or by what acts mere voting control in a foreign corporation is merged into
policy direction and management control, and thus into an interstate commerce
activity.
92. Most of the analogous cases are distinguishable on this basis that the use of
interstate channels was only incidental to a local business or on the ground that the
undertaking did not involve any interstate transfer. Ware and Leland v. Mobile Co.,
209 U. S. 405 (1908) (cotton broker's contracts did not necessitate any interstate move-
ment of goods); Blumeastock Bros. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252 U. S. 436 (1920)
(contracts of advertising agencies "did not involve any movement of goods or merchan-
dise in interstate commerce, or any transmission of intelligence in such commerce," at
442); Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U. S. 200 (1922) (the use of
the channels of interstate commerce was only incidental to the local businr of giving
baseball exhibitions); Hart v. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 12 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A.
2d, 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 703 (1926) (booking arrangements were not there
interstate commerce, although by retaining jurisdiction in the case, the Supreme Court,
262 U. S. 271 (1923), established that such arrangements may be, or may directly involve,
interstate commerce). With these cases compare Marienelli v. United Booking Offices
of America, 227 Fed. 165 (S. D. N. Y. 1914) (booking agencies, contracts with performers
are interstate commerce); Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U. S. 291, 312 (1923) (con-
tracts of film exhibitor with distributor, providing for transactions in interstate com-
merce, are part of that commerce).
The doctrine that insurance is not commerce has too specialized an application to be
valuable as an analogy. The business of insurance was held to be one of indemnity
[Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. 1868)] in which the interstate intercourze was only
an incidental feature. The long line of cases on the point are further distinguishable
in that they involve only the power of the states over insurance. It is conceivable that,
given a federal attempt to regulate, the Court would modify its doctrine; spmcialliy since
insurance has now become distinctly an interstate undertaking. Cf. New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U. S. 495 (1913).
1936]
YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45
But the Public Utility Act does not stand or fall on the commerce clause.
The bulk of the provisions of the Act are bottomed on the postal power as
well.93 Congressional restrictions on the use of the mails have in the past been
relatively few.94 Consequently there exists no large body of authority which
can serve adequately to limit or define the full nature of this power. Theo-
retically it should be more extensive than the commerce power because the
government's interest in the mails is proprietary rather than merely regulatory.0 6
The instant Act, however, does not raise the question of whether the power
over the mails is absolute; it is not necessary to decide whether the postal
facilities can be denied or their use conditioned at the caprice of Congress with-
out reference to the publc needY5 The prohibitions of the Holding Company
Act are only a limited exercise of power, applying only to those uses of the
mails which are recognized as being in pursuance of practices inimical to the
public welfare.9 7 The restrictions imposed have a discernible basis in the public
policy sought to be effectuated. Holding companies are not made complete
postal outlaws.98
93. The grant of power to "establish post offices and post roads," apparently so
innocuous as to merit no serious discussion by the state constitutional ratification con-
ventions, has already proven elastic enough to validate a governmental monopoly of a
tremendous business enterprise (the carrying of the mails) and may yet be the medium
for extensive federal regulation. The standard discussion is RoosS, PosTAL PowER oF
CONGRESS (1916).
94. Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 (1922) (Grain Futures Act);
Jones v. Securities and Exchange Comm., N. Y. L. J. Dec. 14, 1935, at 2415, col. 2
(C. C. A. 2d) (Securities Act).
95. 2 WILLOUGHBY, CoNsrrruloN (1929) 1105, 1106. That the Bill of Rights Imposes
a limitation has been clearly implied, however. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 732
(1877); Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 430 (1920) (dissent).
96. The court in The Matter of American States Public Service Co., supra note 73,
found it necessary, however, to consider this question, after declaring that the Public
Utility Act does not deny the use of the mails "with respect merely to matter the
transmission of which through the mails shall first have been found to be contrary to
the public interest, but it excludes communications of every kind whatsoever indulged
in by these companies [within the classifications of the Act] or individuals without regard
to the character of such communications, other than that they shall relate to the bus Ine s
of these companies or individuals-on the theory that they are 'affected with a national
public interest' " Yet § 1 of the Act has specified practices which have been ascertained
to be adverse to the public interest, and the ensuing prohibitions of the Act appear to
be rather closely confined to those uses of the mails which further these adverse practices.
It is no valid objection that the prohibitions include related matter, If that matter is
linked to the evil consequence sought to be avoided. Horner v. United States, 143 U. S.
570 (1892). Likewise it is not necessary that every article sent through the mails be
inimical to the public if the general class to which that article belongs has been found
to be detrimental and the general prohibition is necessary for effective protection of the
public. See Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 416 (1920) (future
issues of a newspaper barred although many would probably contain no objectionable
matter).
97. Namely, the milking devices and the financial manipulation found to be harmful
to the consumer and the investor.
. 98. The all-inclusive nature of the act is readily explained by the fact that the
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Considerable significance may well be attached to the fact that the power of
Congress to exclude matter from the mails has thus far not been curtailed by
the Supreme Court.9 9 Congress, through its power of exclusion, may exercise a
general police power over the content of the mails.1 10 This is true even though
its regulations are unrelated to the business of transporting the mails. l°0
Under the postal power, moreover, Congress may prevent the use of the mails
for purposes which it deems socially undesirable, notwithstanding the fact that
it may be constitutionally unable to deal directly with the wrong involved.(1 2
In pursuance of the police power Congress has excluded from the mals lottery
tickets and related matter;1 03 obscene articles;104 seditious matter;' 0 ' and in-
strumentalities of fraud. 0 5 Somewhat closer as an analogy to the instant legisla-
tion is the denial of the mails to publications which fail to furnish information
relative to ownership and circulation, or fail to indicate all paid-for matter by
the designation of "advertisement."'0 0 The Public Utility Act differs only in the
extent to which it is carried and the closeness of the connection between the use
of the mails and the infliction of the injury. Essentially the same objections,
however, apply to this exercise of the power over the mails as those previously
discussed with reference to the denial of the channels of commerce to security
issues. It is unlikely that, if the power is denied in the one instance, it will be
allowed in the other, although the proprietary nature of the power over the mails
and the absence of any restrictive decisions may have a considerable bearing on
the decision of the court.
Should this legislation be held to fall within the powers of Congress either
to regulate commerce or to control the use of the mails, its provisions may
nevertheless be vulnerable to attack under the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment as being unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious interference with
liberty or property.10 7 Whether a given exercise of power exceeds this restric-
irregular practices of holding companies have been so numerous that any effort to give
the public complete protection from them must have a breadth coextensive with the evil.
99. A dictum in Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S. 288, 316 (1913) indicates
that there are limitations. See also, supra note 95.
100. See Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 507 (1904); and note the
dictum on page 506 that the legislature, having established such a postal service, may
annex such conditions to it as it chooses.
101. See Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, loc. cit. supra note 95.
102. See In re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110, 133 (1892); Badders v. United States, 240 U. S.
391, 393 (1916).
103. In re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110 (1892); Homer v. United States, 143 U. S. 570
(1892). Also unregistered securities, Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commisaon, N. Y.
L. J. Dec. 14, 1935, at 2415, col. 2 (C. C. A. 2d).
104. Grimm v. United States, 156 U. S. 604 (1894).
105. Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497 (1904); Badders v. United States,
240 U. S. 391 (1916).
106. Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S. 288 (1913).
107. A dual test to determine the validity of legislation under the due process clause
was suggested in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 525 et seq. (1934): (a) the means
must bear a substantial relation to the end, (b) and the measures enacted must not be
unreasonable. Reasonableness, it is emphasized, depends upon the relevant facts of each
specific case as presented. For the judicial career of "due process," see Moxr, DuE
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tion can be determined only by balancing social gains against individual losses.
Where, as in the legislation under consideration, the contradiction between
these competing principles of private right and public welfare is sharp, a nice
problem is presented as to which shall prevail. Yet it should be decisive that
the business here involved has long been recognized as subject to extensive
governmental control in the public interest. s08 Many of the regulations here
employed are familiar under the state public service laws and blue sky legis-
lation. That which is due process in state regulation of operating companies
should likewise be due process in a federal regulation of holding companies
which seeks to protect the same paramount public interests. The general
measures employed by Congress in the Holding Company Act are not an
unreasonable means of securing this objective. Prohibitions are familiar in
Congressional enactments and have always been held consistent with due
process of law where benefit to the public has been perceived.' 0 9 And the
prohibitions of Section 4 are conditional rather than absolute. The power to
regulate commerce implies the power to exclude those who refuse to be regu-
lated; and, conceding the-public benefit, there is nothing unreasonable about
the exercise of that power. The regulations of, and restraints on internal
practices of corporations have also withstood due process objections on many
occasions.1 ° Thus, interference with the internal management of a business
is no evidence per se of a denial of due process. Such interference is always
allowed if there is commensurate public benefit therefrom. It is not pretended
that every provision of the Act is a reasonable one. The complexity and
diversity of the Act makes it advisable to defer a consideration of specific
provisions until they are presented in issue by actual cases. Yet the conclu-
PROCESS OF LAw (1926); and for the recent applications of due process of law, sea
Powell, Commerce, Pensions and Codes (1935) 49 HARV. L. REV. 1.
108. JoNEs AND BiGHAx, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1931) 163; NASu, Ecou-
OMICS OF PUBLIC UTnxrr's (2d ed. 1931) 111. For full information, in tabular form,
about state commissions and their powers, see Hearings, supra note 20, at 1926 et seq.
109. In addition to the cases cited, supra note 81, see Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S.
623 (1887) (the manufacture and sale of liquor); United States v. Popper, 98 Fed. 423
(N. D. Cal. 1899) (distribution of contraceptives); Sturges and Burn Co. v. Beauchamp,
231 U. S. 320 (1913) (prohibiting child labor); and Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292
(1924) (forbidding night work by women). It does not follow that because a trans-
action when separately considered is innocuous, it may not be included in a prohibition,
the scope of which the legislative body considers essential to the accomplishment of a
purpose within the admitted power of the government. Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch,
226 U. S. 192 (1912). Cf. Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606, 609 (1903) (all sales of shares
of stock on margin made void).
110. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (1898) (hours of labor); Otis v. Parker, 187
U. S. 606 (1903) (stock sales on margin); Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578 (1913)
(size and weight of loaves of bread); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389
(1914) (insurance companies); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394 (1915) (types of
building materials); Hall v. Geiger Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539 (1917) (sale of stocks and
bonds); Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U. S. 110 (1922) (real estate brokers); Dlliingham
v. McLaughlin, 264 U. S. 370 (1924) (receipt of deposits); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U. S. 365 (1926) (zoning); Packer Corporation v. Utah, 285 U. S. 105 (1932)
(uses of bill boards); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934) (price fixing).
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sion that, in general, the Act is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious seems
justifiable in view of the complex fact set-up to which the law is addressed.
The one section of the Act which will probably be subjected to the most
serious attack under the due process clause is Section 11, which provides for
thd elimination of functionless holding companies. It is this section which
occasioned such a bitter controversy in Congress before its passage. It will
be argued that this so-called "death sentence" will force liquidations, depre-
date security values, and depress the market 1 1 Emphasis will be placed on
the loss which will fall on investors, yet it is doubtful whether any liquida-
tions incident to the operation of this section will cause more than a temporary
loss to investors."2 Further, it is difficult to understand how any undesirable
results will be traceable to the enforced liquidation rather than to the unsound
financial structure which it is believed necessitates such liquidation. If inves-
tors come out with interests equivalent in value to those whch they claim under
the existing corporate organization, they have no cause to complain. The
cases under the Sherman Act are adequate authority to establish that divest-
ment and dissolution are not necessarily inconsistent with due process.113 It
is material that Section 11 does not provide for the wholesale elimination of
holding companies, but is restricted to those which "unduly and unneces-
sarily" complicate the corporate structure or "unfairly and inequitably" dis-
tribute the voting power. Nor is integration to be fully pursued if it can be
obtained only at the sacrifice of operating economies. 1 4  Thus the section
seems to be directed solely at the elimination of those holding companies -which
serve no valid social or economic function, but which are useful only as instru-
111. Hearings, supra notes 18 and 20, passir.
112. Liquidations, where necessary, need not be rapid; they can be carried out over
as long a period of time as the state of the market makes necessary. Initial loae-
should readily be recouped through the resultant increase in value of operating company
securities. Experience in the dissolution of the Standard Oil Co. and the American
Tobacco Co., although there the capital structure was somewhat more simple than in
the more complex utility holding companies, at least establishes that dissolution can beL
accomplished with benefit to the investors. Standard Oil stock was at 600 at the com-
mencement of the dissolution, and after a set-back to 500 it rose to an all time high of
1200. See Hearings, supra note 20, at 361, supra note 18 at 220. It is possible that a
quiet process of reorganization with exchanges of securities could be carried out vith
no real loss to anyone. In this connection see the reorganization activities of utility
systems in recent months as reported in New York Times Oct. 18, 1935, at 2, col. 7;
id. Oct. 24, 1935, at 4, col. 3; id. Nov. 6, 1935, at 40, col. 6; id. Nov. 11, 1935, at 30,
col. 1; id. Nov. 16, 1935, at 21, col. 1; id. Nov. 20, 1935, at 33, col. 4; and id. Dec..
2, 1935, at 31, col 1.
113. United States v. Joint Traffic Assoc., 171 U. S. 505, 559, 571-573 (1898);
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 228-229 (1899); Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 332 (1904); United Shoe Machinery Corp-
v. United States, 258 U. S. 451, 462-4 (1922); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U. S. 1 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106 (1911).
114. Section 11 (b) (1), allowing a holding company to control additional systems
(A) if they could not be operated independently without loss of operating economies, (B)
if such additional systems are located in one region, and (C) if the retention of control does
not impair operating efficiency or the effectiveness of regulation.
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ments for the furtherance of the abuses which occasioned the instant legisla-
tion.11 Accordingly the section appears to be a reasonable measure for the
elimination of abuses, rather than an arbitrary or vindictive assault upon the
holding company form of corporate organization.
The final major constitutional objection to the Public Utility Act is that it
provides for an unwarranted delegation of legislative power to the Securities
and Exchange Commission without supplying the intelligent standards needed
to guide its discretion. This last contention has risen to a position of some
prominence because of recent Supreme Court decisions on the point.110 It is
clear, however, that delegation of power to administrative bodies is unobjec-
tionable provided Congress lays down some intelligible principle, some stand-
ard or rule by which the administrative tribunal can be governed. 117 Implicit
in this question is the distinction between the delegation of power to make the
law, which involves discretion as to what it shall be, and the conferring of
authority to administer the law, which involves a discretion as to the details
of its execution."18 In the instant Act the subject of regulation has been
clearly defined by Congress; the general principles which are to guide the
administration of the Act are set forth in Section 1. But Congress has not
been content with such a broad standard as has been there set forth. In each
of the subsequent sections a detailed policy has been prescribed. This Act is
a veritable code of rules for the guidance of the Commission. The mere fact
that in certain instances provision is made for the exercise of discretion does
not invalidate the law."19 The broad outlines of the Act reveal the scope of
115. And applies only to those holding companies engaged in some transaction In inter-
state commerce or in some other activity within the paramount power of Congress to
regulate. Cf. Hopkins Federal Savings and Loan Assoc. v. Cleary, U. S. L. Week, Dec.
10, 1935, at 250, col. 1.
116. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935). See Cousens, The Delegation of Federal Legislative
Power to Executive Officers (1935) 33 MicH. L. Ra-. 512; Note (1935) 49 HAnv. L. Rv.
332.
117. A long line of decisions establishes the point. See in addition to the cases cited,
supra note 116, Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 43 (U. S. 1825); Buttfield v. Stranahan,
192 U. S. 470, 496 (1904); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 (1911); Hampton and
Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 409 (1928).
118. See Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 693 (1892).
119. In the application of certain rules the Commission has been given authority to
govern itself by what is "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors or consumers." While this is an elastic phrase it is not objectionable
when it is used for the effectuation of a well-defined purpose. Such expressions have
repeatedly received judicial approval: Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U. S.
409, 424 (1916); Mahler.v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 44 (1923); N. Y. Central Securities Corp. v.
United States, 287 U. S. 12, 24 (1932); Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros., 289 U. S,
266, 285 (1932).
Further, there is a point beyond which it is no longer reasonable or practicable for
Congress to prescribe fixed rules, and necessity compels the use of discretionary terminology,
Finally, here, as in the Guffey Bill [P. L. N. 402, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. (1935)], there Is a
real danger that the powers of the Commission have been frozen in too rigid bonds. Cf.
Comment (1935) 45 YALa. L. J. 293.
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the Congressional purpose and the individual portions of the Act drastically
limit the range of activity within that scope. In the light of previous decisions,
this delegation of administrative authority seems to be sustainable.02
If the Public Utility Act can survive the attacks made on its constitution-
ality, it seems well designed to preserve the benefits which can accrue to the
public from the use of the holding company device in the electric utility field.
The attempt has been made to retain the efficiencies and economies which can
be secured by carefully constructed and integrated systems of ownership and
operation. At the same time, the major objective is to eliminate those specific
abuses which have made the public utility holding company notorious. To
strike a mean between elimination and preservation is no easy task. Experi-
ence in administration of the Act can alone test the wisdom of its many pro-
visions. Before such experience can be gained, however, serious administra-
tive difficulties must be overcome. Among the more serious difficulties of this
type will be the development of a personnel adequately trained to understand
the complexities of the electric industry, and the handling of the problems
incident to reorganization and the protection of minority interests.
STATE TAXATION OF RADIO BROADCASTING STATIONS
RADIO broadcasting has developed rapidly from its earphone infancy of the
early 1920's In 1922, two years after the first broadcast over a regularly
operated station, approximately four hundred stations were broadcasting to
sixty thousand families in the United States; in 1932, sixteen and a half
million receiving sets were reached by programs emanating from over six
hundred broadcasters. 2 And in that year the total gross receipts of the
industry surpassed seventy-five million dollars.3 For several years the belief
120. Not only was the act apparently drafted to meet the objections which proved fatal
in the Panama Refining Co. and Schecter cases, supra note 116, but it is distinguishable from
those cases in that the delegation involved is not to the executive branch of the govern-
ment but to a permanent administrative commission independent of the executive. The
delegation therefore does not constitute an abandonment of the legislative function and,
since it is not made to a coordinate branch of the government no serious problem of separa-
tion of powers seems to be involved.
1. Until 1920, the principal use of radio was through the use of Morse Code in point
to point communication. Gary, Regulation of Broadcasting in he United States (1935)
177 AN-ALs 15. The first program over a regularly operated station was broadcast
November 2, 1920 over KDKA, Pittsburgh. HEr=,oa.R, Tim Usc or RAtxo Bnocs=oG
As .ur ADvERISn~Z MxmDumz nT Tr UmxnE STATES (1933) 216. The first commercially
sponsored program was broadcast in 1925 and the first permanent network organized in
1926. Hettinger, Broadcasting in the United States (1935) 177 Axnmxs 1. See Hettinger,
Some Fundamnental Aspects of Radio Broadcasting Economics (1935) 14 HriR%. Bus. Rxv. 14.
2. For complete tables, see HErarm, Tam Us or RADio Bno.%nc)sr;o m A, ADV=T=S-
,u Amfr=ur iN Tam UxN-= STATES (1933) at 42, 68.
3. Id. at 109. This was the peak year for the industry. From that time on it has
suffered from depression curtailments by advertisers. In 1933, its receipts were approximately
$57,000,000; and the first half of 1934 showed gross earnings of $38,000,000.
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that the industry, by virtue of its interstate character, was immune under the
federal constitution from state taxation 4 repelled legislators from subjecting
it to taxation despite the apparent wealth of certain broadcasting units, and
their consequent ability to pay some taxes.5 But recently, various state gov-
ernments, hard pressed to balance depression budgets, have contemplated or
4. Cases declaring radio broadcasting interstate commerce have usually dealt with the
power of Congress to set up agencies to regulate and license broadcasters. This function
has been carried on since 1912 and is now under the supervision of the Federal Com-
munications Commission, successor to the Federal Radio Commission. The reasons for,
and basis of, uniform federal supervision are found in the scientific factors that radio
waves, upon leaving their source, are capable of travelling indefinite distances in unforsee-
able directions across state boundaries. Such waves not only may collide with waves emanat-
ing from other stations, thereby causing imperfect reception, but even after these dis-
persing waves have ceased to carry clear sounds they still may be heard by receivers In
the form of distortions. See DAvis, LAW or RADIo COixMUNxCA iOx (1927); Kennedy,
Radio and the Commerce Clause (1932) 3 AiR L. Ray. 16. Hence, by allotting specific air
paths and hours of broadcasting to licensed operators, federal agencies have sought to
alleviate these difficulties. Their attempts have universally been upheld by lower federal
courts on the ground that radio broadcasting is interstate commerce and a proper subject
of federal control. See e.g., White v. Federal Radio Commission, 29 F. (2d) 113 (N. D.
ill. 1928); United States v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 31 F. (2d) 448 (N. D. Ill
1929), aff'd 52 F. (2d) 318 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931), cert. denied 282 U. S. 374 (1931);
noted in (1929) 14 MiNN. L. Ra,. 176; General Electric Co. v. Federal Radio Commisklon,
31 F. (2d) 630 (App. D. C. 1929); City of New York v. Federal Radio Commission, 36
F. (2d) 115 (App. D. C. 1929); Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Federal Radio
Commission, 62 F. (2d) 854 (App. D. C. 1932); 35 Ops. Ainey GEN¢. 126 (1926); DAVIS,
RADIo LAW (1935) 48-50; Lee, Power of Congress Over Radio Communication (1925)
11 A. B. A. J. 19; Gary, Regulation of Broadcasting in the United States (1935) 177 ANNArs
15; Comment (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 245.
In deciding miscellaneous issues dealing with radio broadcasting, state and federal courts
have also adopted this interstate interpretation. Whitehurst v. Grimes, 21 F. (2d) 787
(E. D. Ky. 1927), noted (1928) 26 MTca. L. Rav. 919 (municipal license tax on radio
operators declared invalid as undue interference by municipality with federal commerce
power); Van Dusen v. Department of Labor & Industries, 158 Wash. 414, 290 Pac, 803
(1930) (state compensation act held inapplicable to workman injured while repairing
facilities of broadcasting station); Station WBT, Inc. v. Paulnot, 46 F. (2d) 671 (E. D.
S. C. 1931) (State tax on privilege of owning a receiving set declared unconstitutional as
contravening commerce clause) noted (1931) 44 HARe. L. REv. 992; (1931) 79 U. or PA.
L. REV. 1148. See (1934) 5 AiR L. REv. 187. And the Supreme Court on one occasion
has recognized by dictum this interstate characteristic of radio broadcasting, Federal Radio
Commission v. Nelson Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266, 279 (1932) ("No state lInca
divide the radio waves, and national regulation is not only appropriate but essential to
the efficient use of radio facilities.")
S. Among the few radio tax laws passed by state and municipal bodies up to 1930 are
tha following: Florida Acts Extra Sess. 1929, c. 14491, §§ 7, 17; South Carolina Acts 1930,
no. 768, p. 1292, repealed by S. C. Acts 1931, no. 149, p. 209, and no. 565, p. 1073; Milmore,
Ky. (Ord. no. 43, Oct. 1, 1926); Minneapolis, Minn. (Ord. of Feb. 11, 1927, §§ II-11 as
amended May 13, 1927); Marsefield, Ore. (Ord. No. 1220, Mar. 7, 1927); Roseburg, Ore.
(Ord. No. 904, April 4, 1927). The South Carolina statute taxed radio receiving sets
and was repealed after it had been declared unconstitutional. Station WBT, Inc. v. Poulnot,
46 F. (2d) 671 (E. D. S. C. 1931); noted, (1931) 44 HAxv. L. Rav. 992; (1931) 79 U.
oF PA. L. Rav. 1148.
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enacted revenue measures designed to subject radio broadcasters to taxation.0
These attempts have aroused considerable comment on the part of writers and
wide-spread opposition by broadcasters' attorneys and protective associations.7
Since the Supreme Court of the United States has not yet passed on the legality
of such measures, the ultimate limits within which state and local governments
may proceed against radio broadcasting remain undefined.
An analysis of the problem of taxation of radio broadcasting companies
centers about the interpretation and ramifications of the formulae that a state
cannot tax property or business beyond its territorial jurisdiction under the
fourteenth amendment;8 and that local tax burdens on interstate commerce
either by direct taxation of gross receipts from such commerce, by taxation of
the privilege to engage in it, or by any other measures involving an undue inter-
ference with its conduct contravene the commerce clause.P The types of
taxation which have received the attention of the Supreme Court may be classi-
fled broadly into property taxes, upon ownership of land and chattels, and excise
taxes, upon either the privilege of, or the actual conduct of business.10
6. Washington, in 1933, levied an occupation tax applicable to radio broadcasters.
WASH. REv. STAT. (Remington, 1934) §§ 8326-1 to 8326-30. It was upheld in Fi er's
Blend Station Inc. v. Tax Commission of Washington, 45 P. (2d) 942 (Wash. 1935).
Atlanta, Ga. recently subjected radio broadcasters to a municipal license tax which was
upheld by the Supreme Court of Georgia. City of Atlanta v. Oglethorpe University, 178
Ga. 379, 173 S. E. 110 (1934). The City of New York in the winter of 1935 tabled a
proposed amendment which was intended to embrace radio stations in a tax of 3c, on
"gross operating income.' PRoposrz A xmN r ro LocAl. LAws or Cxrz or N. Y. (1934)
No. 21 (1935).
7. See DAvis, LAw o RADIo CommuxlcAasoN (1927) at 81; So.%L and Srr=r.er, ST,%Tz
AND MumazcinA REGu-ATiON or RAzio (1929); Bechhoefer, State Taxation of Radio Cr-
,nunication (1931) 1 J. RADio L. 477; Van Allen, State and Municipal Regulation of Radio
(1931) 1 J. RADio L. 35; DAvis, RADio LAW (1930); Kennedy, Radio and the Commerce
Clause (1932) 3 Am L. REv. 16; Wright, State and Federal Regulation of Radio Broadcasting
(1933) 2 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 13. The recent Georgia case, supra note 6, was withdrawn
from the docket of the United States Supreme Court pending an appeal because of the
poorness of the record which rendered it, according to the radio broadcasters' attorneys,
unsuitable for test case purposes. Indicative, also, of the efforts of radio broadcasters to
avoid taxation is their activity in causing tabling of the proposed law before the New York
City Board of Estimate and Apportionment, supra note 6, and the pamphlet recently issued
by the National Association of Broadcasters excoriating, with the aid of legal quotation
and citation, any form of local taxation of radio broadcasters. 3 N. A. B. RProrrs 773
(1935).
8. State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300 (U. S. 1872); Gloucester Ferry Co.
v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 206 (1885); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky,
199 U. S. 194, 202 (1905); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 489 (1925); 1 COOLE,
TAXoATio § 384.
9. 1 Cooi-av, TAXATioN §§ 368 et seq.; Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal
Authority by the Taxing Power of the States 11 (1918) 31 HARv. L. RLv. 572.
10. Before proceeding to a consideration of these various classifications of local taxes,
it seems advisable to dispose of the objection that, since federal licensing is prerequisite to
the operation of radio broadcasting, it should be deemed a federal instrumentality and,
hence, immune from state taxation under the McCulloch v. Maryland doctrine. Such
immunities are extended only to business activities which, at least in part, perform or
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Property Taxes. As in the case of any interstate industry, states may tax the
local property of radio broadcasters without incurring the prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 8 Nor will such taxation be declared a direct burden
on the interstate business of the broadcaster. Since the tangible property of
the broadcasting unit usually consists of studio facilities used in the preparation
and performance of programs, and of transmitting apparatus situated where
the mechanical functions necessary to the broadcast are conducted, both types
of property having a permanent situs, no problem of allocating the taxable
value of instrumentalities moving between states would normally arise.11 Hence,
the application of any tangible property tax law which is based on an ad valorem
measure, and which is aimed at the intrinsic worth of the physical property of
the broadcaster presents no difficulties. 2
But a state tax law whose purpose would be to reach the intangible property
values arising from the use of radio transmitting apparatus in the business of
broadcasting presents more difficult problems. State taxation of intangibles
has been frequently and effectively applied to railroads and other agencies of
interstate communication on the assumption that the value of the tracks, road-
beds, cars, wires, and poles, assessed as so much wood, stone, and metal, is
greatly enhanced by virtue of their use in the interstate business in which they
are employed.13 But here again, the tax is invalid unless the intangible value
aid in the performance of a function of the federal government. Telegraph Co. v. Texas,
105 U. S. 460 (1881); Williams v. Talledega, 226 U. S. 404 (1912). And, since the business
of broadcasting is almost universally carried on for private gain, and involves the conduct
of no governmental function, and since the license issued by the Federal Communications
Commission in the exercise of what is purely a police power is supplemented In each
case by a state charter of incorporation, it would seem apparent that the situation of radio
broadcasters falls without the purview of the federal instrumentality doctrine. Moreover,
since even the property of the federal government is not free from non-discriminatory state
taxation, the property of radio broadcasters, even were they deemed to be agents of the
federal government, would not be immune from state taxation, National Bank v. Common-
wealth, 9 Wall. 353 (U. S. 1869). See Thomas v. Pacific Rr., 9 Wall. 579 (U. S. 1869);
Rr. Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5 (U. S. 1873); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Mass.,
125 U. S. 530 (1888); Broad River Power Co. v. Query, 288 U. S. 178 (1933); Isaacs,
The Federal Protection of Foreign Corporations (1926) 26 COL. L. Rav. 263, 268. But
see Bechhoefer, State Taxation of Radio Communication (1931) 1 J. RAXio L. 477, 489,
where the author expresses doubt as to the legality of state taxation on radio broadcaster's
federal franchise.
11. For discussions of the problems arising in such instances, see 1 CooLEY, TA~X AIoX
§ 385; Isaacs, The Unit Rule (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 838.
12. Of course, where the broadcasting studios and the transmitting apparatus are
situated in different states, ad valorem taxation must be directed only against those tangibles
situated in the taxing jurisdiction. And similar consideration must be given the situation
where broadcasting studios and apparati of several stations, under the same ownership,
are situated in more than one state.
13. This is ordinarily termed the "value that arises from the use of the property by a
going concern." Isaacs, The Unit Rule (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 838, 843. Taxation of such
intangible values by states where properly allocated to the state has been universally held
to constitute no undue burden on interstate commerce. 1 CooEY, TAXATioN § 386. It
is recognized as an effort to reach the "true" value of the tangibles in their business setting.
See statement by Holmes, J., in Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66, 69 (1920); cf. The Delatware
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has a situs in the taxing jurisdiction. This requirement is met in those cases by
applying against the total intangible value of the company a fraction derived
from comparing the local property, or gross receipts from local business, or
other local incidence, with similar factors adhering to or resulting from the total
business of the taxpayer. The proportion reached is that part of the intangible
value of the entire concern which is deemed properly allocable to the taxing
state. 3 Although it is readily recognized that this so-called unit rule does not
achieve a precise allocation, it has been universally upheld on the ground that its
use sufficiently approximates an accurate result, in the absence of direct proof
that it has given incorrect situs to certain intangible values.O 4
But, in the case of radio broadcasting companies, because of the singular
absence of local standards which might serve as bases of comparison with total
quantities represented in the interstate business of the broadcaster, it would
seem that the unit rule would fail of application. For, since gross receipts from
local business cannot be exactly computed because of the apparent difficulties
in allocating this local activity, the only local constant would be the physical
property of the broadcaster. And, since this, in most instances, is located
entirely within one state, the application of the unit rule would fail for want of
a comparative figure representing property located in other jurisdictionsY5
But despite the apparent unavailability of the unit rule in such cases,
it may not be improper under the principle enunciated in Adams Express Co. v.
Ohio State Auditor,' to allocate to the situs of all the tangible property of a
broadcasting company, the total intangible property value of that company. In
that case it was held that the intangible value of property should be spread
over places where tangibles are situate because the unity of these tangibles
used in a going concern gives rise to the intangible values. Accordingly, it would
seem to follow, by implication, that where the entire unit of tangibles is situated
in one state, all the intangible value arises from their use in that state; hence,
Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206 (U. S. 1873); Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry.
Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 439 (1894); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Taggart, 163
U. S. 1 (1896); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194 (1897); Adams
Express Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 171 (1897); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Miszouri,
190 U. S. 412 (1903); Rodell, A Primer on Interstate Taxation (1935) 44 Y=un L. J. 1166,
1172. The excess intangible value which arises from use of tangibles in a going concern
may also be taxed separately. St. Louis & East St. Louis Elec. Ry. v. lissouri, 256 U. S.
314 (1921); Baker v. Druesedow, 263 U. S. 137 (1923); Isaacs, supra note 11, at 846.
14. State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, 608 (1875). Where the inequity of this
apportioning method, as applied to the taxpayer can be proved, the court will declare the
use of the rule invalid. Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490 (1904); Hans Rees' Sons v. North
Carolina, 283 U. S. 123 (1931).
15. It is conceivable that in the case where one company owned stations situated in
several states, the local property of one station of the taxpayer might serve as a basis
of comparison with total property represented by all stations. This, however, is not the
usual occurrence. Radio stations usually are incorporated individually. The property of
the single unit is the total property of the taxpayer. The national chain, described in
note 25, infra, should not be confused with the situation where one corporation owns
several stations in other states, since membership in, and not ownership by, the national
chain organization is the characteristic situation of local stations in national chains.
16. 165 U. S. 194 (1897); see Isaacs, supra note 11, at 844.
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it may tax the entire intangible value. Nor would such taxation by the state
wherein the radio broadcaster's apparatus is located result in multiple taxation
which the fourteenth amendment has been construed to prohibit.17 For, it is
difficult to conceive on what basis any other state could levy upon this intangible
value. Any attempt by a jurisdiction other than that of the tangibles' situs
to tax the intangibles would run afoul of the Adams case,' since there would
be no tangibles within that state to which any intangible value could be said
to adhere. Moreover, additional justification for permitting the situs of all the
tangible property to tax the entire intangible value of the radio broadcaster
may be found in the fact that it, alone, affords protection to the property of
the corporation.' s
Excise Taxes. The validity of excise taxation of radio broadcasting stations,
whether imposed in the form of a tax on the privilege of conducting radio
broadcasts or on the actual conduct of such business, must also be determined
in the light of the rules concerning interstate commerce which the Supreme
Court has enunciated. It is established that the local business of a corporation
engaged in interstate and intrastate commerce may be taxed if it can be sep-
arated from the interstate business.' 9 But where an industry cannot withdraw
from local business without seriously hampering or concluding its interstate
business because of the inseparability of both phases, the Supreme Court has
declared by dictum in at least three instances that any privilege tax upon such
an industry, being a tax on the entire industry and not solely upon its local
incidence, is violative of the commerce clause, and hence void.2 ° The latter
generalization, however, would seem applicable only where the business of a
particular concern is substantially interstate.
17. This construction has appeared primarily in state inheritance tax cases and Is of
comparatively recent origin. See Rodell, supra note 13, at 1174; Rottschaefer, State
Juridiction to Impose Taxes (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 305, 307 et seq. For the attitude of
courts before 1930, see 1 CooLEY, T&x.'.losr § 230.
18. The so-called "benefit" theory of taxation receives discussion in 1 CooLEY, TAxATioN
§§ 19, 20, 89; Merrill, Jurisdiction to Tax-Another Word (1935) 44 YALs, L. J. 582, 585,
But see note 15, supra.
19. Allen v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 191 U. S. 171 (1903); New York ex rel. Penn-
sylvania Rr. Co. v. Knight, 192 U. S. 21 (1904); Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60 (1905);
1 COOLr.Y, TAXATioN §§ 388, 389.
20. See Sprout v. City of South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 171 (1928); East Ohio Gas Co,
v. Tax Commission of Ohio, 283 U. S. 465, 470 (1931); Cooney v. Mountain States Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co., 294 U. S. 384, 393 (1935). The dictum seems to have been stated
originally by Brandeis, I., in the Sprout case. It is reiterated by Butler, J., in East 0hio
Gas Co. v. Tax Commission of Ohio and by Hughes, J., in the Cooney case. The wording
is "A State may, by appropriate legislation, require payment of an occupation tax from
one engaged in both intrastate and interstate commerce. . . .But in order that the fee or
tax shall be valid, it must appear ...that the person taxed could discontinue the Intra-
state business without withdrawing also from the interstate business." The cases cited
in support of this proposition do not contain such clear cut language. Leloup v. Port
of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (1888) (state license tax on telegraph company's entire business) ;
Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47 (1891) (express company doing partially local busi-
ness); Adams Express Co. v. City of New York, 232 U. S. 14 (1914) (same); Bowman
v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642 (1921) (flat tax on privilege of maintaining gasoline
station doing local and interstate businesses).
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In the recent case of Fisher's Blend Statim v. Washington Tax Commission,2 '
wherein the Washington Supreme Court sustained a state excise tax upon radio
broadcasting stations, the above rule was avoided by invoking the argument
that for purposes of taxation the business of radio broadcasting is exclusively
intrastate. While the court in that case recognized the interstate characteristics
of radio broadcasting which made federal regulation necessary, it employed
the analogies of interstate and international bridge corporations to prove that
the business of radio broadcasting was intrastate in character. In the bridge
cases, the Supreme Court upheld local excise taxes upon proprietors of such
bridges, on the ground that the business of the proprietors consisted merely in
the rental of the bridge facilities, which is intrastate in character; the persons
who lease the use of the bridge themselves conduct the.interstate business in
transporting articles across the bridge.22  In like fashion, the Washington
Supreme Court conceived that owners of radio stations merely rent their
facilities to sponsors, which is an intrastate function; and the sponsors, alone,
engage in the transmission of sound waves across state lines. Accordingly the
former were held amenable to any sort of local excise taxp
Though the conclusion reached by the Washington court may be defensible
when applied to many radio broadcasters, its analogies appear to be ill-chosen.
The sponsor does not remunerate the broadcaster for the rental of its facilities
but rather for the performance of services in transporting speech and music to
listeners. In this sense, the business of a radio broadcaster would seem to be
more analogous to that of a carrier or a telephone or telegraph company, in that
the sponsor of a radio program entrusts his "goods" or messages to the broad-
caster to send to the listener rather than carry them himself as would the user
of a bridge. Viewed in this light, the issue remains as to whether the business
of a particular radio station is local so that, regardless of the inseparability
dictum,2 0 it may be reached by local excise taxation; or whether it is both
intrastate and interstate and the two phases so inextricably interwoven as to
prevent local excise taxation.2 0
Since it is the transportation of speech and music to listeners at the request
of sponsors which constitutes the business of a radio station, the factor which
would seem to determine whether that business is intrastate or both intrastate
and interstate, is the destination to which the sponsor paid to have his program
carried, viz. to a local audience, or to both a local and an out of state audience.
The problem then is to determine the intent of the sponsor.24  And in the
21. Fisher's Blend Station Inc. v. Tax Commssion, 45 P. (2d) 942 (Wash. 1935). The
tax was one per cent on gross income for the privilege of engaging inter alia, in the radio
broadcasting business. See (1935) 24 GEo. L. J. 180; (1935) 84 U. or PA. L. Rsv. 251.
22. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 150 (1897); Detroit International
Bridge Co. v. Corporation Tax Appeal Board of Michigan, 294 U. S. 83 (1935). Powell
Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers of the Stat-es-VI.
(1919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 374, 392.
23. Cf. City of Atlanta v. Oglethorpe University, 178 Ga. 379, 173 S. E. 110 (1934)
(municipal tax on radio broadcasters upheld).
24. The destination intended by the passenger or sender of goods determines whether
the commerce is local or interstate. Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Rr. Co. v. Settle,
260 U. S. 166, 171 (1922); Sprout v. City of South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 163 (1928);
cf. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. Hancock, 253 U. S. 284 (1920).
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determination of that matter, pertinent factors would seem to be the type and
size of the business the sponsor advertises, its reliance upon purchase of its
products out of the state, and the choice of radio station which is made.
Relative to the choice of station, the proximity of a particular station to the
borders of a state, as well as the relative range thereof determined by the
Federal Communications Commission,25 are factors which might aid in the
determination of the extent to which a sponsor intends to reach local and
out of state audiences. If it can be shown, as a result of investigation based
on these factors, that all the sponsors of a particular station intend that their
programs shall reach only a local audience because they anticipate drawing
substantially all their business from that source, it would be justifiable to
treat the business of that station as entirely intrastate, and accordingly amen-
able to local excise taxes. In such cases, the mere fact that incidentally some
listeners in other states might hear a program sponsored by a local merchant,20
would be of no consequence in the determination of the type of business of a
station, in view of the fact that substantially the sole purpose of such program
is to reach a local audience. Similarly, if it can be shown that some sponsors,
employing a particular station, intend to reach local audiences only, even
though others using the same broadcasting unit are interested to a substantial
extent in out of state purchasers, it would seem that the local portion of the
station's business might be separated from the total and taxed, without incurring
the ban of the inseparability dictum. It is conceivable, however, that all of the
sponsors of a particular radio station might be found to employ the station to
advertise to a substantial out of state audience, as well as to a local audience,
in which event an excise tax would be invalid under the rule that such a tax may
not be imposed upon a concern which cannot withdraw from local business
without concluding its interstate business. For, unless local listeners were pro-
hibited from freely using their receiving sets, it would be impossible for a
broadcaster to abandon its local broadcasts for these sponsors and continue its
interstate transmissions.2 7
25. For discussion of the functions of the Federal Communications Commission In rating
stations according to location and power see e.g., Journal Co. v. Federal Radio Commission,
48 F. (2d) 461 (App. D. C. 1931); Hettinger, Broadcasting in the United States (1935)
177 ANNALs 1, 7, 8; Gary, Regulation of Broadcasting in the United States, 177 ANNAs 15,
26. The Columbia Broadcasting System, in a national survey based on thorough can-
vassing of listeners, concludes that of its ninety-six station affiliates, only twelve are not
heard by out of state listeners. C. B. S. LisTznnIo AREAs (3d series, 1935). But in the
present stage of technological development, no precise measure of the size of radio audiences
seems obtainable. Crossley Incorporated, a national research organization which has been
experimenting in measuring the size of individual program audiences for the past six years
reports in a letter to the YALE LAW JoURNAL that it can reach no precise result, The
National Broadcasting Company likewise expresses doubt as to whether any method can
be devised for audience measurement since transmitting and reception conditions vary from
day to day.
But it has been suggested that available approximations of the size of the radio audience
within the limits of a state might be sufficiently accurate to support state taxation measures.
Bechhoefer, State Taxation of Radio Communication (1931) 1 J. RADio L. 477, 488. The
author cites WBT Inc. v. Poulnot, 46 F. (2d) 671 (E. D. S. C. 1931) where the tax payer
actually presented such figures to the court.
27. Of course, in a particular case, as in situations involving the unit rule, It would
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The national hookup system, however, introduces an additional complication.
The national hookup is a device for reaching a great number of local audiences
simultaneously by means of transmitting a program via telephone wires from
the central station to local broadcasting stations, which thereupon broadcast
the program to audiences within their vicinity.2 For this function of broad-
casting, the local station receives its remuneration from the hookup system.p
If this transaction be regarded as a single uninterrupted process, then in those
instances in which the program emanates from a state other than that in
which the particular station is located, it would seem to be interstate in char-
acter. Accordingly, that portion of the business of a radio station which
consists of the transmission of such programs would be immune from any local
excise tax. But it is at least arguable that, actually, there are two steps
involved in the broadcast over a national hookup. The first is the transmission
of the program from the central station to the local station. The second is
the relaying of that program from the local station to its listeners. 0 And each
of these functions is separate from the other; so that the mere fact that the
first step involves the transmission of the program across state lines is not
determinative of whether the broadcasting business of the local station is
intrastate, or both intrastate and interstate. In the determination of this
latter matter, the intent test previously mentioned would appear to be relevant.
Thus, if the sponsor of the program on the national hookup employed a
be within the power of the broadcasting station to prove that the character of its businE-
was different from the conclusions reached by the assessor. WBT, Inc. v. Poulnot, 46 F.
(2d) 671 (E. D. S. C. 1931). See Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490 (1903); Hans Rees' Sons
v. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123 (1931).
28. It is to be observed that, in the use of the national hookup, despite the presace
of the connecting telephone wires, the listener's reception results from the broadcast of
radio waves by the local station, and not directly from telephonic transmiceon by the
central station where the program actually is performed. For a more detailed di-cusson
of the mechanics and growth of networks, see HEm-Tnxo, Tun Usr or RADio Bno.Dcmsnx=o
As AN AD VERTsI G MEDIUM IN TIM UNITED STATES (1933) 80 et seq. The most recently
available statistics show that the membership of fourteen networks throughout the United
States comprises more than two hundred and seventy-five local stations, some of which
are in Canada. The two major networks are the Columbia Broadcasting System vith
ninety-five members and the National Broadcasting System with ninety-four. Some net-
works do not embrace stations in more than one state. RADho ADvETsnm: RAs AND
DATA (Sept. 1935) 7-12.
29. The national hookup is also used for what is called a "sustaining" program. This
type of broadcast lacks commercial sponsorship. It is supplied by the network organization
to its local member stations, who, during those hours which are not sold to advertisers,
may retain their audiences and supply them with a better program than could be
mustered individually. For this service, the local station pays the national system. Hcr-
TnIGER, op. cit. supra note 28 at 89, 90.
30. It would seem no less real to divide up the broadcast on a national hookup thusly,
than to separate the generation of electrical current from its transmion into other states.
The Supreme Court has adopted the latter separation to uphold a state excise tax upon
the generation process. Utah Light and Power Co. v. Pfost. 286 U. S. 16S (1932); Broad
River Power Co. v. Query, 288 U. S. 178 (1933). For criticism of the scientific basis of the
distinction upheld in the latter cases, see Comment (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 94, 96, 97. See
HETTINGE , op. cit. supra note 28, at 80 et seq. for description of network system.
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member station for the purpose of reaching only a local audience, it would
seem proper that that portion of the business of the station be considered local,
and hence subject to local excise taxation. If, however, the sponsor intended
to reach a substantial out of state as well as local audience through the
facilities of the particular local station, that portion of the latter's business
might be immune from taxation under the doctrine, previously mentioned, that
where the industry cannot withdraw from its local business without concluding
its interstate business, a tax upon the local business will be held void as a
tax upon what is an inseparable part of an interstate business. In ascertaining
the intent of the sponsor on the national hook-up in using the local station to
reach only a local audience, or both a local and out of state audience, the
proximity of the station to the borders of other states, and the employment of
stations in the surrounding states in the hookup would be of special importance.
For, if stations in adjoining states are likewise used in the hookup, it may be
reasonable to infer that the station is used to reach only an audience within the
state of its location.3'
SUITS BY REPRESENTATIVES TO SET ASIDE
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
BETWEEN the parties a fraudulent conveyance is irrevocable,' and even
though the original fraudulent conveyance statute2 declared such transactions
31. The technology of radio broadcasting presents another basis for legal analysis
which may enable states to exact excise taxes from some broadcasting stations, Some scien-
,tific authority exists to support the observation that the ultimate broadcast of electro-
magnetic waves into the ether is dependent upon two distinct physical phenomena.
Generation of electrical energy, by the same means as is used by the ordinary manufacturer
of electric current for illumination and other common purposes, is the first step, Trans-
mission of this electrical energy carrying sound waves into the ether is the second. Wright,
State and Federal Regulation of Radio Broadcasting (1933) 2 GEo. W. L. REV. 13, 18.
Using the analogy of Utah Light & Power Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165 (1932) wherein the
Supreme Court pf the United States recognized this division in passing on the validity of
a state tax on the business of generating electrical current as distinguished from its trans-
mission into other states, it has been argued that the function of generating electrical
current by radio broadcasters, as a preliminary step to the dissemination of the radio
waves via the ether, is purely a local business and taxable as such. See Wright, supra at 18.
It is "manufacture" not "commerce," an activity long since held amenable to local taxation
on the ground that the processes of manufacture form no part of movement in interstate
commerce but rather are succeeded by such movement once the manufacture ceases. See
Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517 (1886); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1 (1888); United States
v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895); ("commerce succeeds to manufacture and is
not a part of it.") Cf. Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172 (1923).
Such a tax, however, could be levied only upon such radio broadcasting stations as
generate their own electrical current, and, upon the analogy of the Pfost case, would be
restricted to a specified rate per kilowatt hour generated.
1. The court, by way of punishment for the attempted fraud, will refuse to grant
relief to a party who has "unclean hands" or is "in pari delicto." Dent v. Ferguson, 132
U. S. 50 (1889); Gest v. Gest, 117 Conn. 289, 167 AtU. 909 (1934); Rosenbaum v. Heub-
ner, 277 Ill. 360, 115 N. E. 558 (1917).
2. 13 Eliz., c. 5. For the text of this statute see GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVYANCES
(1931) 587.
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"dearly and utterly void," the conveyance has been allowed to stand until
impeached by creditors. While the rights of the transferor and his creditors are
clearly defined, complex problems have arisen as to what rights and powers
are possessed by representatives appointed in bankruptcy, receivership, an
assignment for the benefit of creditors, or the settlement of the estate of the
debtor-transferor on his death, in relation to property fraudulently conveyed
previous to any of these proceedings. An initial problem is whether or not the
appointed representative is the representative of creditors and therefore legally
entitled or required to recover property fraudulently conveyed or its value, or is
subject to the disabilities of the transferring debtor. And if it is conceded that
the representative is legally empowered to maintain a suit to recover such
property, problems remain as to whether or not all of the property or its full
value may be recovered, or only that amount which individual creditors could
have recovered, and whether or not the amount recovered should be distributed
among all of the creditors or only among those who could themselves have
recovered in individual actions in the absence of appointment of the representa-
tive.3 In the resolution of these issues, the courts have reached various results.
Trustees in Bankruptcy
The right of the trustee in bankruptcy to sue to recover property fraudulently
conveyed by the bankrupt is dear under sections 67 (e) 4 and 70 (e) 5 of the
Bankruptcy Act. By 67 (e) it is made the trustee's duty to set aside any
fraudulent conveyance made within four months of the petition in bankruptcy,
and 70 (e) vests in him the right to set aside any transfer by the bankrupt of
his property which any creditor could have avoided, thus freeing him of the
four months limitation of 67 (e).3 Section 47 (a), 7 giving the trustee the rights
of a judgment creditor with execution returned unsatisfied, supplements 70 (e)
and enables him to set aside transactions in fraud of creditors in those states
where, either by interpretation or by express provision of statute, only lien
creditors can do so.8 Thus the trustee in bankruptcy may attack any transfer,
including chattel mortgages0 and transfers covered by the Bulk Sales Acts10
enacted in almost all jurisdictions," if any creditor of the bankrupt could have
challenged them in the absence of bankruptcy proceedings.
How much the trustee may recover and to whom such recovery shall be
3. These questions become pertinent in jurisdictions where subsequent creditors are
not given the right to attack the transaction in question.
4. 30 StAT. 564 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 107 (1926).
5. 30 STAT. 565 (1893), 11 U. S. C. A. § 110 (1926).
6. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 605 (1918).
7. 36 STAT. 840 (1910), 11 U. S. C. A. § 75 (a) (2) (1926).
8. Brown v. Crawford, 252 Fed. 248 (D. Ore. 1918); GInBET's CosLra, B,=nurm
(3d ed. 1934) p. 1285; 4 REm-IxoT., BArmupTCcy (3d ed. 1923) §§ 1403, 1404, 1547.
9. Moore v. Bay, 284 U. S. 4 (1931); Ignatius v. Farmers State Bank, 272 Fed. 33
(C. C. A. 9th, 1921).
10. Brown v. Kossove, 255 Fed. 806 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919); Gross v. Grossman, 2 F.
(2d) 458 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924); American Trust and Savings Bank v. Durham, 293 Fed.
304 (C. C. A. 7th, 1924).




distributed is a more complicated question. It seems clear that under Section
67 (e), a fraululent conveyance within four months of the filing of the petition
may be recovered in full for the benefit of all creditors.12 But where the
fraudulent conveyance is made more than four months before the petition is
filed, and recovery is to be made under 70 (e), much controversy has arisen
as to what extent the trustee may pursue the grantee and what disposition is
to be made of the recovery. Since he sues under the latter section as representa-
tive of the creditors and not in his own right,18 some courts have favored allow-
ing recovery only to the extent of the claims of defrauded creditors14 and a
sharing of the proceeds only with those creditors,"; with the necessary con-
sequence that any surplus shall be returned to the fraudulent grantee. These
decisions may be justified on the ground that there is apparently little reason
for implying that the institution of bankruptcy proceedings should so change
the status of all parties concerned as to alter the recovery allowed or the parties
entitled thereto. Under this view, justification for placing the right of recovery
in the hands of the trustee who represents all creditors, rather than permitting
each defrauded creditor individually to pursue the fraudulent grantee, may be
found in the desire to eliminate unnecessary litigation and to avoid the ad-
ministrative difficulties necessarily resulting from the uncertainty of the bank-
ruptcy claims of those creditors who proceed to recover the fraudulent con-
veyance.
But other courts have held that recovery in full from the fraudulent grantee
should be allowed' 6 with equal distribution of the proceeds among all creditors
having provable claims,1' any surplus to be returned to the grantee or other-
wise disposed of as decided by the Bankruptcy Court.18 This holding seems
more desirable than that previously mentioned. While it is true that in the
absence of a bankruptcy proceeding the fraudulent grantee might have been
liable for the return of property fraudulently received, or the value thereof,
12. ". . and all property of the debtor conveyed .. .as aforesaid shall . . . be and
remain a part of the assets and estate of the bankrupt and shall pass to his said trustee
whose duty it shall be to recover and reclaim the same by legal proceedings or otherwise
for the benefit of the creditors .. ." See 4 Raarmo=oN, op. cit. supra note 8, § 1539.
13. Scales v. Holje, 41 Cal. App. 733, 183 Pac. 308 (1919); In re Gray, 47 App. Dlv.
554, 62 N. Y. Supp. 618 (1st Dep't, 1900); 4 RE=nNGTON, op. cit. supra note 8, § 1517.
14. Dodd v. Raines, 1 F. (2d) 658 (N. D. Ga. 1924); Scales v. Holje, 41 Cal. App.
733, 183 Pac. 308 (1919); cf. Globe Bank v. Martin, 236 U. S. 288 (1915) [under § 67
(f) of the Bankruptcy Act].
15. American Trust and Savings Bank v. Duncan, 254 Fed. 780 (C. C. A. 5th, 1918);
Dodd v. Raines, 1 F. (2d) 658 (N. D. Ga: 1924); Note (1932) 41 Yale L. J. 629. See
4 RmwGoN, op. cit. supra note 8, § 1539.
16. Davis v. Gates, 235 Fed. 192 (M. D. Pa. 1926); Cunningham v. Mitchell, 126
Wash. 294, 218 Pac. 386 (1923); Goetz v. Newell, 183 Wis. 559, 198 N. W. 368 (1924);
GILBERT's CoLL m, op. cit. supra, note 8, at 1294; cf. Moore v. Bay, 284 U. S. 4 (1931).
17. In re Kohler, 159 Fed. 871 (C C. A. 6th, 1908); In re Moore, 11 F. (2d) 62 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1926); Lytle v. Andrews, 34 F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929); GxizBrT's Cor-
LiER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1294; cf. Moore v, Bay, 284 U. S. 4 (1931). This was also
the general holding under the Act of 1867. Kehr v. Smith, 88 U. S. 31 (1873).
18. Davis v. Gates, 235 Fed. 192 (M. D. Pa. 1916); Cunningham v. Mitchell, 126 Wash.
294, 218 Pac. 386 (1923); Goetz v. Newell, 183 Wis. 559, 198 N. W. 368 (1924).
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only to the extent to which defrauded creditors had been injured thereby,
there is reason for holding that, once bankruptcy proceedings have been insti-
tuted, all of the property so conveyed or its value should be recovered and
that only the surplus remaining after all creditors have been satisfied should
be returned fo the fraudulent grantee. Although section 70 (e) would seem
to permit the trustee to maintain a suit to recover property fraudulently con-
veyed only when a creditor represented by him could have done so 10 once this
requirement is fulfilled, the section places no limitation on the amount of the
recovery which may be had.2 0 Indeed, literally interpreted, it rather enables
the trustee to recover all of the property fraudulently conveyed, or its full
value, from the person to whom it was transferred. Apart from the wording of
the statute, it also seems justifiable to permit full recovery by the trustee since,
in the absence of the fraudulent conveyance, it is not unlikely that the assets
conveyed might have come into the bankrupt estate and so have become avail-
able for all of the creditors with provable claims. Moreover, while the trans-
feror will not be permitted to recover property fraudulently conveyed for the
reason that, as between two wrongdoers the law will not act to remedy the
present status,' nevertheless, in the case of bankruptcy, innocent creditors are
opposed to the fraudulent transferee and there is no apparent reason for per-
mitting the transferee to retain any of the fruits of his fraudulent transaction
against such creditors.
It would seem proper also to distribute the recovery allowed among all of
the creditors whose claims have been allowed, rather than only among those
who could themselves have set aside the conveyance. To hold otherwise would,
in effect, be to grant to the latter creditors a preference over the others?1
Since the Bankruptcy Act allows only certain specified priorities and no such
provision is made for defrauded creditors, and since the supposed purpose of
the act is to distribute the assets of the bankrupt estate equally among creditors
not expressly preferred,m it would seem to follow that any property recovered
from the fraudulent transferee should be distributed equally among all creditors.
Such a conclusion derives additional support from the fact that, since assets of
the estate in the hands of the trustee will be taxed in the prosecution of the
suit to reach assets fraudulently conveyed, the property in the hands of the
trustee, and to that extent the shares of the other creditors, may be diminished
accordingly. Further, the administration of the bankrupt's estate may be pro-
longed and complicated if, previous to distribution of the assets, it must be
determined which creditors had been defrauded and which not.
The Bankruptcy Act, as passed in 1898, required the trustee to bring his suit
in the state courts unless there was diversity of citizenship or the defendant
19. Cobb v. First National Bank, 263 Fed. 1000 (N. . Ga. 1920); Wilkinson v.
Walker, 294 Fed. 939 (N. D. Texas, 1923).
20. "The trustee may avoid any transfer by the bankrupt . . . which any creditor
might have avoided, and may recover the property so transferred or its value ... 1'
21. See In re Kohler, 159 Fed. 871, 873 (C. C. A. 6th, 1903).
22. 34 STAT. 267 (1906), 11 U. S. C. A. § 104 (1926).
23. See Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U. S. 438, 449 (1901); In re Swofford
Bros. Dry Goods Co., 180 Fed. 549, 556 (W. D. Mlo., 1910).
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consented to an action in the federal bankruptcy courts. 24 But amendments to
sections 67 (e) and 70 (e) of the act26 now permit such suits even in the
absence of diversity of citizenship, to be brought in either the federal or state
courts at the option of the trustee.26 If the trustee chooses to sue in the state
courts, almost without exception he has been permitted to sue either at law or
equity.27 The federal courts, however, are divided as to whether or not this
may be done in suits entertained by them.28 By statute, suits in equity may not
be maintained in any court of the United States when there is an adequate
remedy at law.- Some federal courts have held that this provision prevents
suits in equity by the trustee to recover specific property or money paid over
in fraud of creditors, the remedy at law being adequate.8 0 Other federal courts,
however, have held that the fraud involved is sufficient to give equity jurisdic-
tion without regard to the remedy sought.3 '
Receivers
There is no inclusive federal statute governing receiverships such as there is
concerning bankruptcies. Hence, when a receiver is appointed to take over a
business and wind it up, question arises as to what rights shall be granted the
appointee in the matter of fraudulent conveyances made by the corporate debtor
prior to the receivership.3 2 Where such receivers are appointed under statute,
the right to recover property fraudulently conveyed or its value is generally
accepted.3 3 In the absence of statute, a few courts have denied the right of
recovery to the receiver on the ground that he is the mere assignee of the
debtor and therefore is subject to the debtor's disabilities.84 The majority view,
however, seems to permit recovery by the receiver.3 6 As a corollary to this
24. 30 STAT. 552 (1898) § 23; Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U. S. 524 (1900).
25. 32 STAT. 800 (1903) § 16, 11 U. S. C. A. §§ 107 (e), 110 (e) (1926).
26. Davis v. Gates, 235 Fed. 192 (M. D. Pa. 1916); Matthew v. Coppin, 32 F. (2d)
100 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929).
27. See Harper, Recovery of Property by Trustees in Bankruptcy in the Federal Courts
(1930) 78 U. or PA. L. REv. 461, 465.
28. Wall v. Cox, 101 Fed. 403 (C. C. A. 4th, 1900) (equity action allowed); In re
Cockfield, 300 Fed. 116 (E. D. S. C. 1924) (equity action allowed); Adams v. Jones,
11 F. (2d) 759 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926) cert. denied 271 U. S. 685 (1926) (equity action
denied). See Harper, supra note 27, at 474.
29. 36 STAT. 1163 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 384 (1926).
30. Adams v. Jones, 11 F. (2d) 759 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926); Sessler v. Nemcof, 183 Fed,
656 (E. D. Pa. 1910).
31. Wall v. Cox, 101 Fed. 403 (C. C. A. 4th, 1900); see Harper, supra note 27, at 469.
32. The problem does not appear in the case of the continuing receiver whose authority
and powers are generally limited to those expressly stipulated upon his appointment.
33. Heineman v. Hart, 55 Mich. 64 (1884); Alexander v. Relfe, 74 Mo. 495 (1881);
see GLENN, FRAUDULEN2T CONVEYANCES (1931) § 101. For examples of statutes expressly
authorizing recovery, see N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 268 and N. Y. PRsoNAL Pnor-
ERTh" LAW § 19.
34. Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 135 111. 150, 25 N. E. 680 (1890). See also
Folsom v. Smith, 113 Me. 83, 92 Atl. 1003 (1915), holding that corporate receivers enforce
only the rights of the company unless expressly empowered by statute to enforce the rights
of creditors.
35. Olson v. Voorhees, 292 Fed. 113 (C. C. A. 3d, 1923); Curtis v. Lewis, 74 Conn.
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view, the receiver has been permitted to enjoin such proceedings by a creditor,
presumably to prevent unnecessary litigation.30 Thus while, generally, it is
said that defenses good against the debtor are good against his receiver, the
suit by a receiver to recover property fraudulently conveyed is recognized as an
exception to that rule. Since the object of an equity receivership is to collect
all assets of the debtor and distribute them among such creditors as have valid
claims, and since to deny the receiver the right to recover property fraudulently
conveyed opens the door for. a race among the defrauded creditors to satisfy their
claims out of the fraudulently conveyed property, thereby resulting in unneces-
sary litigation and administrative difficulty due to the unsettling of claims, the
holding that the receiver is the representative of the creditors for the purpose
of recovering property fraudulently conveyed seems the better view.
While the equity receiver has often been regarded as a proper party to re-
cover property fraudulently conveyed, the bankruptcy receiver, on the other
hand, is generally denied such rights on the ground that he is a mere custodian
of the estate until a trustee is duly appointed to take possession of the assets.
T
At least one federal court, however, has declared that where the transfer was
patently fraudulent and voidable by the trustee, the court may direct the re-
ceiver without suit to take possession of the property if that appears necessary
to prevent waste or dissipation of the estate.38
Assignees for Benefit of Creditors
A close relationship is found between the case of the general equity receiver
and the assignee for benefit of creditors. Some jurisdictions have statutes
specifically vesting the assignee for benefit of creditors with title to all property
fraudulently conveyed or authorizing him to proceed against fraudulent trans-
fers in the interest of the creditors.30 Where such statutes exist, it is, of course,
clear that the assignee may recover property fraudulently conveyed.P° A similar
result has fbeen reached where the assignee is appointed pursuant to statute,
although he is not specifically granted the right to recover fraudulent convey-
ances.41 The rationale of the courts is to the effect that where the assignee is
appointed under authority of statute title devolves on him by operation of law
and he becomes a representative of the creditors subject to the orders of the
court, and consequently, may set aside any transactions void as to the creditors
367, 50 AUt. 878 (1902); Sayle v. Guarantee Savings and Loan Co., 2 Ohio Circ. Ct. R.
401 (N. S. 1903); Washington Mill Co. v. Sprague Lumber Co. 19 Wash. 16S, S2 Pac..
1067 (1898).
36. Attorney-General v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 272 (1879).
37. In re Kolin, 134 Fed. 557 (C. C. A. 7th, 1905); Guaranty Title and Trust Co.
v. Pearlman, 144 Fed. 550 (W. D. Pa. 1906); see 1 CoLmm, BAnnnur= 12th ed. 1921
p. 50.
38. In re Haupt Bros., 153 Fed. 239 (S. D. N. Y. 1907).
39. See e.g., Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 84; N. Y. REAL Pnopmr- Lpw § 268.
40. Walton v. American Investment Company, 140 Ky. 472, 131 S. W. 275 (1910);
Simpson v. Warren, 55 Me. 18 (1867); Baillargeon v. Dumoulin, 148 N. Y. Supp. 443
(Sup. Ct. 1913).
41. Seibert v. Milligan, 110 Ind. 106, 10 N. E. 929 (1886); Chapin v. Jenkins, 50 Kan.
385, 31 Pac. 1034 (1893); Pillsbury v. Kingon, 33 N. J. Eq. 287 (1880); re Grm.Em,
Cmrroas' RiGms mm RErmiEDs (1915) § 400.
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whom he represents. 42 Where, however, the assignment is of the voluntary
common law type, the assignee has usually been considered a mere volunteer
"standing in the shoes of the debtor" and subject to the disability of the debtor
to set aside the fraudulent transfer.43 Thus the test of the right of the assignee
to set aside fraudulent conveyances has been whether or not the assignee ap-
pears to act as directed by the assignor or is under judicial control as an officer
of the court. But a few cases have held that the voluntary assignee, although
usually subject to the same defenses and disabilities as the debtor, is to be
considered the representative of the creditors at least in respect to fraudulent
conveyances, and have allowed him to set them aside.44 As in the case of the
general equity receiver, the latter result seems preferable. The purpose of the
assignment, like the receivership is the collection of all the debtor's assets for
distribution among bona fide creditors and there are the same cogent reasons
for allowing recovery.
Executors or Administrators
The decisions of the courts in regard to the right of the so-called "personal
representatives" of a deceased debtor, namely, his executor or administrator,
also display some of the same confusion found in the case of receivers and as-
signees. In England, the executor or administrator was early deemed to
represent the decedent and his estate rather than the decedent's creditors, and
he was therefore held subject to the disabilities of the decedent against fraudu-
lent conveyances. 45 In this country, however, an executor or administrator has
been generally declared to occupy a twofold representative capacity, namely,
representative of the decedent and his estate for the benefit of heirs and legatees
and representative of the creditors of the estate.46 Thus the question arises as
to when he shall be deemed to represent one group and when the other. A
number of decisions in this country have adopted the English common law
view; 47 but examination shows that almost all of the cases so holding involve
estates which were solvent or at least inferentially solvent because of absence
of evidence to the contrary. Where an estate is solvent, any recovery permitted
would result to the benefit of only the beneficiaries of the estate, who in legal
contemplation are entitled to no greater rights than the testator as regards
42. Seibert v. Milligan, 110 Ind. 106, 10 N. E. 929 (1887); see Housel v. Cremer, 13
Neb. 298, 302 (1882); GLENx, op. cit. supra note 41, §§ 400, 401.
43. Watson v. Bonfile, 116 Fed. 157 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902); Moore v. Schneider, 196
Cal. 380, 238 Pac. 81 (1925); Home Savings and State Bank v. Wheeler, 74 Ill. App.
261 (1897); GLEirN, op. cit. supra note 41, § 292.
44. Schaller v. Wright, 70 Iowa 667 (1886); see Universal Road Machinery Co. v.
Skinner, 105 Conn. 584, 588, 136 Ati. 468, 470 (1927).
45. Hawes v. Leader, Cro. Jac. 270 (1610).
46. See Hewitt v. Sanborn, 103 Conn. 352, 378, 130 Atl. 472, 481 (1925); In, re Hess'
Will, 120 Misc. Rep. 372, 198 N. Y. Supp. 573 (Surr. Ct. 1923). "An administrator
serves in a dual capacity. While he is the personal representative of the deceased, he acts
at the same time as trustee for the latter's creditors . . ." Chester County Trust Co. v.
Pugh, 241 Pa. 124, 126, 88 Atl. 319, 320 (1913).
47. Arteaga v. Arteaga, 169 Ga. 595, 151 S. E. 5 (1929); Cicero Trust and Savings
Bank v. Schermann, 252 Ili. App. 449 (1929); Bankers' Trust Co. v. Bank of Rockvllle
Center Trust Co., 114 N. J. Eq. 391, 168 AtI. 733 (1933).
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property fraudulently conveyed. Refusal of recovery in such circumstances is
therefore justifiable. In those cases, however, in which the estate is insolvent,
there seems to be a definite tendency in favor of allowing a recovery by the
administrator or executor as the representative of the creditors,48 and, in a
number of jurisdictions, statutes now specifically empower the executor or
administrator to proceed against fraudulent transferees when there is a de-
ficiency of assets in the estate.49 When a creditor requests that such an action
shall be brought, failure on the part of the representaivi to sue has been de-
dared a violation of legal duty justifying his removal.50 Since the recovery of
property fraudulently conveyed is solely for the benefit of creditors and not
for the heirs, legatees, or devisees of the decedent-debtoru' it seems that any
portion of the property remaining after all of the claims of creditors had been
satisfied should be returned to the grantee.
As in the case of bankruptcy, if it be admitted that the receiver to wind up
the business, the assignee, and the executor or administrator may sue to re-
cover property fraudulently conveyed, they should be able to recover the full
value of such property and distribute it equally among all creditors, returning
to the fraudulent grantee only the surplus. The considerations mentioned
previously for permitting recovery in full against the fraudulent conveyee in
the case of bankruptcy, namely that the assets might otherwise have come into
the estate and thereby increased the shares of each creditor, and that as between
innocent creditors and a fraudulent transferee, the law should favor the former,
are equally applicable in the case of the receiver, assignee, and decedent's
representatives. Factors of administrative convenience considered previously as
a reason for the distribution of all assets recovered among all creditors would
also apply to all classes of representatives discussed.
CORPORATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST PROMOTERS
FOR FRAUD
THE question frequently arises as to the right of a corporation to recover
profits made by its promoter in the sale of his own property to the corporation
at a price higher than he himself paid for it, notwithstanding the fact that the
promoter, by his stock control, has obtained the consent of the corporation to the
transaction. If at the time the corporation consents, there are stockholders or
48. Regan v. Turner, 69 Colo. 194, 193 Pac. 557 (1920); Howell v. Howell, 211 Iowa
70, 232 N. W. 816 (1930); Swartz v. Bachman, 267 Pa. 185, 110 AtL 260 (1920); "An
administrator may by bill seek discovery of assets and cancellation of fraudulent con-
veyances by a decedent so far as necessary to satisfy the claims of the latter's creditors...
(The) . . . administrator represents the creditors and stands in their right . . ." Rob-
inson v. Dana's Estate, 174 At. 772, 774 (N. H. 1934). Contra: Estes v. Howland, 15
R. I. 127, 23 At. 624 (1885).
49. See e.g. I-. STAT. (Burns' Ann. 1926) " 3179-82; Wrs. STAT. (1931) § 312.13.
50. Millen v. Kavanaugh, 268 Mlass. 73, 167 N. E. 291 (1929); In re McCluskey, 116
Me. 212, 100 At. 977 (1917).
51. The heirs, legatees, and devisees, taking directly from, and not adverely to, the
decedent transferor may be considered as subject to all his disabilities and thus not entitled
to any portion of the recovery as against the fraudulent grantee.
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subscribers who are unaware of the profits, they may bring suit in the name of
the corporation to recover the secret profits on the theory that the promoter has
breached his fiduciary duty to disclose.1 Under the Massachusetts rule in the
Old Dominion case, this fiduciary duty was extended to the incoming subscribers
where the promoters held all of the issued, but not all of the authorized stock at
the time the corporation consented, and issued additional stock later as part of
the original scheme of promotion to persons unaware of the profit.2 The Supreme
Court of the United States, on the same facts, refused so to hold on the ground
that, since all the corporation's then existing stockholders were aware of the facts
and had ratified the sale, and since the corporation subsequently retained its
identity in spite of changes in the constituency of its stockholders, it was bound
by such consent.3 Even the Massachusetts court was unwilling to extend its
rule to allow the corporation to recover when, at the time the corporation con-
sented, all of its authorized and issued stock was held by the promoters, although
they immediately resold the stock to the public as part of the plan of promo.
tion.4 In this situation the innocent stockholders are transferees of the promoter,
and, unlike the incoming subscribers, their stock has consented to the profits.0
That these are distinctions of form rather than substance, and that the "con-
sent" of the corporation, with the promoter acting on both sides of the transaction
is purely illusory, has been pointed out." However, where the property is sold
to the corporation at approximately its market value, it seems reasonable to use
the fiction of the corporate consent to avoid the severity of the fiduciary rule,
as neither incoming stockholders nor creditors will be injured by this profit. 7
As a result of this doctrine of "consent" barring a corporate right of action,
stockholders and creditors injured by the promoter's fraud may be limited to the
inadequate remedy of individual actions of fraud and deceit, depending on how
the promotion is effected. Thus, if the promoter should secure an option on cer-
tain property for $2,000,000, its approximate market value, and then resell it
to the corporation for $7,000,000 par value stock, the corporation selling $3,000,-
000 par value stock for cash to the public, in addition, these latter subscribers
would have two alternative remedies against the promoter for the injury caused
by the immediate decrease in their equity, one based upon a breach of fiduciary
1. Davis v. Las Ovas Co., 227 U. S. 80 (1913) ; Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co.,
3 App. Cas. 1218 (1878).
2. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N. E.
193 (1909). Where no future stockholders are contemplated there is no recovery. In re
British Seamless Paper Box Co., 17 Ch. D. 467 (1881).
3. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewlsohn, 210 U. S. 206 (1908).
4. Hays v. The Georgian, Inc., 280 Mass. 10, 181 N. E. 765 (1932); Ball v. Breed, 294
Fed. 227 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), cert. denied, 264 U. S. 584 (1924); Comment (1933) 19 VA.
L. REv. 274; Note (1933) 85 A. L. R. 1262.
5. See Mason v. Carrothers, 105 Me. 392, 399, 74 AtI. 1030, 1033 (1909).
6. EmacH, PROMOTERS (1916) § 121; BALLANTmE, COR'ORanbONS (1927) § 50; Berle,
Compensation of Bankers and Promoters through Stock Profits (1929) 42 1HAtv. L. REV. 748.
7. Henderson v. Plymouth Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 347, 141 At. 197 (1928). It has been
suggested that even the Massachusetts rule of the Old Dominion case places too much of
a burden on the promoter. See Isaacs, The Promoter: A Legislative Program (1925) 38
HA~v. L. Rzv. 887.
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dutys and the other on the statutory liability of an original subscriber of par
value stock, issued in exchange for overvalued propertyP Creditors, although
they could force the promoter to pay in the par value of his watered stock if
the company became insolvent,10 could not directly sue for recovery of secret
profitS." In the event of insolvency, however, the receiver of the corporation
could, on their behalf, enforce both the right of the corporation to recover the
secret profits,'2 and the statutory duty of the promoter to pay the par value on
the stock.13 However, by issuing all the authorized par value stock to himself
in exchange for his property and then reselling it to the public, the promotor can
effectively cut off liability to the corporation 14 or its receiver, 15 so far as breach
of his fiduciary duty is concerned.' 6  Moreover, the promoter can easily escape
statutory liability to stockholders and creditors for watering stock by issuing
to himself non par stock instead of par stock. Injured stockholders and credi-
tors would then be limited to the inadequate remedy of individual actions for
fraud and deceit.' 7
The reason usually given for not allowing a corporate right of action where
the promoter protects himself by obtaining corporate "consent," is that there
is no corporate injury. Since the corporation has given in exchange for the
property only capital stock, it is said not to be injured by the fictitious valua-
tion of its assets.' s Therefore, a corporate action would be merely a collective
8. See note 1, supra.
9. Wolcott v. Waldstein, 86 N. J. Eq. 63, 97 At. 951 (Ch. 1916); B, uTm, Con-
PORATioNS (1927) § 44a.
10. Easton National Bank v. American Brick & Tile Co., 70 N. J. Eq., 732, 64 Adl. 917
(1906); 1 Coox, CoRPoRATioxs (8th ed. 1923) § 45; BALLrr,, Conromno.s (1927)
§ 213.
11. The fiduciary duty does not extend to creditors; Banque Franco-Egyptienne v.
Brown, 34 Fed. 162, 196 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1888); Allenhurst Park Estates, Inc. v. Smith,
101 N. J. Eq. 581, 596, 138 Atl. 709, 716 (Ch. 1927).
12. Chandler v. Bacon, 30 Fed. 538 (C. C. D. Mass. 1887); Voorhees v. MAUott, 73
N. J. Eq. 673, 69 At. 643 (1903).
13. See v. Heppenheimer, 55 N. J. Eq. 240, 36 At. 966 (Ch. 1897); see Dicherman v.
Northern Trust Co, 176 U. S. 181, 203 (1900).
14. Turner v. Markham, 155 Cal. 562, 102 Pac. 272 (1909); see note 4, supra.
15. Ball v. Breed, 294 Fed. 227 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), cert. denied, 264 U. S. SS4 (1924);
Bostwick v. Young, 118 App. Div. 490, 103 N. Y. Supp. 607 (3d Dep't 1907); Thomphins
v. Sperry, Jones & Co., 96 Mld. 560, 54 AtL 254 (1903).
16. But the creditors or a receiver in their behalf may, nevertheless, he able to hold
the promoter to his statutory liability on the watered stock. Whalen v. Hudson Hotel Co.,
183 App. Div. 316, 170 N. Y. Supp. 855 (3d Dep't 1918); See v. Heppenheimer, 55 N. J.
Eq. 240, 36 AUt. 966 (Ch. 1897).
17. Piggly-Wiggly Delaware, Inc. v. Bartlett, 97 N. 3. Eq. 469, 129 AtL 413 (Ch. 1925). -
The statement of the court that "Had this stock had a par value, and had stock of par
or face value exceeding the value of the rights purchased been issued, a different question
would arise," can only be explained by assuming that the court had in mind the rights
of creditors to recover on watered stock. See Bonbright, Dangers of Shares withlout Par
Value (1924) 24 COL. L. REv. 449; Berle, Problems of Non-par Stock (1925) 25 Cor. L. Rnv.
43; Berle, loc. cit. supra note' 6.
18. Turner v. Markham, 155 Cal. 562, 102 Pac. 272 (1909); Little, Promoters' Frauds
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suit for stockholders, injured personally by the promoter's representations, to
enable them to avoid the prohibitive expense of individual suits. The objection
to such a suit is that the original purchasers of the stock from the promoter may
have sold their holdings, so that subsequent stockholders not injured by the
misrepresentation will receive a windfall. 19 But if, to overcome this objection,
those original purchasers who sold their stock were allowed to recover indi-
vidually in addition to the corporate recovery, the promoter would in effect be
paying twice on the same cause of action.
If, on the other hand, the promoter should take not only all of the stock, but
either cash derived from the sale of bonds 20 or bonds themselves, the stated
value of which exceed the market value of the property, the corporation would
begin its life insolvent and suffer the definite injury of having its liabilities ex-
ceed its assets. A recent case 2 1 raised the issue of the liability of the promoter
under these facts. The promoters acquired an option on certain gas properties
for $2,500,000, which they caused to be fraudulently appraised at $7,000,000.
They then organized the Duquesne Gas Corporation to purchase these properties
in return for all of its authorized and issued non par stock, $4,000,000 in first
mortgage bonds and $1,000,000 in mortgage notes. They resold all of the bonds
and notes and most of the stock to the public, and after paying for the property
had left a very substantial profit. Within two years after its organization the
corporation went into receivership, and the receiver brought an action against
the promoters for an accounting of their profits. The Circuit Court of Appeals
denied recovery on the ground that, the corporation being barred by its consent,
the receiver was likewise barred.22  The Supreme Court reversed in a 5 to 4
decision, and held the promoters liable to the receiver for their profits, on the
theory that the stockholders and the corporation could not by their consent
release the promoter from his fiduciary duty when the rights of creditors would
be jeopardized by the transaction. 21
In reaching its decision, the court points out that the constitution of the
state of incorporation declares that no corporation shall issue bonds for inade-
quate consideration. 23 Thus, while at common law bonds could be issued below
par,24 such a statutory provision would seem to make bonds analogous to par
value stock, in that a receiver on behalf of creditors would be able to recover
from those to whom the bonds were originally issued for overvalued property.23
in the Organization of Corporations: The Old Dominion Copper Mining Cases (1910) 5 ILL.
L. REv. 87.
19. See Weston, Promoters' Liability: Old Dominion v. Bigelow (1916) 30 HAV. L.
Rxv. 39.
20. Creditors in such a case would probably be able to recover on the theory of a
fraudulent conveyance. See Note (1933) 33 COL. L. R-v. 1065.
21. McCandless v. Furlaud, 56 Sup. Ct. 41 (1935). Mr. Justice Cardozo wrote the opinion
of the court; Justices Roberts, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler dissented.
22. McCandless v. Furlaud, 75 F. (2d) 977 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
23. PA. STAT. ANr. (Purdon, 1930) const. art. 16, § 7.
24. Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 123 N. Y. 91, 25 N. E. 201 (1890).
25. See note 16, supra; cf. Wiegand v. Albert Lewis Lumber & Mfg. Co., 158 Fed, 608
C. C. A. 3d, 1908) aff'g In re Wyoming Valley Ice Co., 153 Fed. 787 (N. D. Pa. 1907);
4 Coox, CORPORATONS (8th ed. 1923) § 766.
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Although generally a receiver cannot recover where the corporation is barred,
since he merely takes over the rights of the corporation," he can, by disaffirm-
ing a transfer by the corporation in fraud of creditors- O or by nullifying an act
of the corporation in violation of a statute for the protection of creditors,2 T re-
cover on behalf of creditors, notwithstanding the fact that consent of the corpora-
tion would bar the corporation from such an action. Thus, if the court in the
instant case had limited the receiver's recovery to the excess of the face value
of the bonds over the value of the property exchanged, the basis for the re-
ceiver's right of action could be easily accounted for. Since, however, the re-
covery also included profits from the sale of stock, the decision can only be
explained on the ground that the promoters were held liable to the receiver for
a breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation, as well as for injury to the credi-
tors.i Thus, the court is in effect disregarding the "consent" of the corpora-
tion and making an exception to the Old Dominion rule by permitting an action
on behalf of the corporation where the promoters have rendered the corporation
insolvent from the beginning38
Although there is held to be an injury to the corporation in the present case,
distinct from the injury to stockholders, there is still the question, expressly left
undecided by the court, whether or not the original stockholders and bondhold-
ers, who, having sold out, will not benefit by the recovery of the corporation,
should have individual rights of action for misrepresentation in addition to the
corporate action. That the court was willing, perhaps because of the unlikelihood
of successful individual actions, to overlook the possibility that the original stock-
holders and bondholders might also recover and the promoters thus be made
doubly liable, suggests that the exception may be made the general rule, and
that in every case where the promoter fraudulently overvalues property the
fictional "consent" may be disregarded to allow recovery by the corporation.-
Such a rule would give creditors, through the receiver of the insolvent corporation,
an adequate remedy where none now exists unless the corporation was made
insolvent from the beginning by the promoter's fraud; and, even in cases where
the corporation is solvent, it would enable stockholders to place the corporation
more nearly in the condition in which it was represented to them. The enforce-
ment of the promoter's liability in this manner would tend to foster adequate
disclosure to investors, a desirable result, and no more than is required if the
corporation should register with the Securities and Exchange Commission?)
26. See Attorney General v. The Guardian Mutual Life Insurance Co., 77 N. Y. 272
(1879); Pittsburg Carbon Co. v. McMilin, 119 N. Y. 46, 53, 23 N. E. 530, 531 (1890);
Note (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 1065.
27. Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U. S. 467 (1877); In re Wilcox and Howe Co., 70 Conn. 220,
39 At. 163 (1898).
28. The court expressly refuses to decide whether in a representative suit by stock-
holders "consent" would bar the corporate action, but since the rule is limited to situations
where the corporation is left insolvent, the question would probably not arise.
29. Berle suggests that such stock issues should run the gauntlet of equitable valuation
and that any person whose interests are affected by the issue of such shares has a standing
to complain unless by actual consent, knowledge or laches, he is estopped from so doing.
Berle, loc. cit. supra note 6.
30. The Federal Securities Act of 1933, expressly requires the details of the transaction
between the promoter and the corporation to be given in the corporation's registration state-
ment. 48 STAT. 83, 15 U. S. C. A. § 77aa, (20), (21), (22) (1933).
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